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ABSTRACT 
Turkey's interest to be part of the political and economic union of Europe dates 
back to the 1950s, when the idea of European Union (EU) was born. Almost forty years 
after the first agreement between the two parties, Turkey is still knocking on the EU' s 
door to become a full member. The EU has stepped into the twenty-first century with the 
most comprehensive enlargement of its history in process. The process of enlargement of 
the EU constitutes the most important step in Turkey's relations with the European 
Union. In order to become a full member in the European Union, the applicant state has 
to fulfill the EU's Copenhagen Criteria, which in the case of Turkey requires major 
improvements in its economic and political conditions. However, even if Turkey could 
meet the Copenhagen Criteria, its full membership would probably not be granted due to 
Turkey's significant cultural and religious differences from the rest of the member states. 
Turkey's full membership in the European Union would offer enormous 
advantages for both parties. Turkey's strategic position, which is at the crossroads of 
Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, has great significance for the European Union. 
EU membership for Turkey, on the other hand, would mean an end to its identity problem 
of where it belongs - in Europe or Asia. Turkey's official candidacy status constitutes a 
turning point for Turkey's historic dream of being part of Europe economically, 
politically and socially. Turkey's EU candidacy leaves Turkey important domestic and 
external challenges. The ability of Turkey to overcome these challenges will determine 
the prospects for full membership of Turkey in the European Union. Given the changes 
required for Turkey to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, and the length of time accession 
11 
negotiations would take once these criteria were met, it IS unlikely Turkey will be 
admitted to the European Union before 2020. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A desire to unite Europe has been a main driving force for European politicians 
over the centuries. The peaceful movement to unite "the continent of ongoing wars" 
started with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, 
which is the founding organization of the European Union (EU) today. However, the 
unification that Europe has been experiencing was basically the unification of Western 
Europe. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communism, the 
desire to unite the eastern and western halves of Europe has resurfaced. 
The Luxembourg Summit that took place in December 1997 had a very 
significant and historic conclusion, stating that the EU was willing to enlarge towards the 
East and include the nations of Eastern and Central Europe. 1 Ex-Communist states of the 
region (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) applied for full membership during the 1990s and their accession 
negotiations with the European Union started in 1998.2 In addition to these ten Central 
and Eastern European states, Cyprus also started its accession talks with the Union in 
1998. There were two other applicant states for EU membership that were left out at the 
Luxembourg Summit, and were not declared candidates: Malta and Turkey. The reasons 
these two countries were not declared candidate states were not the same. Malta applied 
for full membership in 1993. After the general elections of 1996, however, the new 
Labour government decided to freeze Malta's application for full membership. Therefore, 
1 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, available from 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/index.htm 
2 loc. cit. 
Malta was not included in the enlargement process of 1997. The accession talks started in 
1998, after another change of government in Malta.3 
Why Turkey was not declared a candidate state at the Luxembourg Summit, even 
though it applied for full membership earlier than the above mentioned states, can 
perhaps be explained by economic and political factors as well as by religious and 
cultural factors. The EU acknowledges that the political and economic problems of 
Turkey do cast a shadow on its efforts to join the Union.4 After the Luxembourg Summit, 
Turkey decided to freeze its relations with the EU as a reaction to that rejection.5 At the 
Helsinki Summit of the EU, in December 1999, the Union stated that the 1997 decision 
was not the last word on Turkey. Although Turkey had no significant achievements 
politically or economically during 1998 and 1999, it was, surprisingly, declared as the 
13th candidate for full membership at Helsinki. 6 Turkey welcomed that decision and 
repeated its desire to be a part of the Union, as soon as possible. 7 Turkey, however, was 
not allowed to begin accession negotiations after the Helsinki Summit. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the relations between Turkey and the 
European Union in a detailed way and to make a prediction regarding the accession issue. 
Turkey's economic and political situation will be examined with reference to criteria set 
3 loc. cit. 
4 Luxembourg European Councils, "Luxembourg presidency B4-1048, 1094, 1095 and 1096/97 
Resolution on the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council of21 November and 12 and 13 
December 1997 and on the term of office of the Luxembourg Presidency" 1 available from 
http://www .europarl.eu.int/enlargement/positionep/resolutions/181297 _ en.htm 
5Turkish Daily News, "Turkey's New EU Status", available from 
http://www .cgd.org. tr/ing/announcement/231299 .htm 
6 European Union Enlargement, A Historic Opportunity, available from 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/corpusen.pdf, p. 31. 
7 Turkish Daily Sabah, 13 December 1999. Note: The translations of Turkish language sources here and 
throughout of this thesis are by the author. 
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by the European Union. The thesis argues that Turkey is unlikely to become a full 
member in the European Union within twenty years for a number of reasons. 
1.1 The Copenhagen Criteria 
In order to become a full member of the EU, each applicant state now has to 
fulfill the "Copenhagen Criteria". During the previous enlargements of the EU, applicant 
countries were not asked to meet specific criteria before joining the Union. Greece, Spain 
and Portugal improved their economic and political conditions once they were members. 
However, the integration of Greece, Spain and Portugal caused huge economic and 
political problems for the EU. Hence, for the next enlargement (in which the central and 
eastern European countries along with Malta and Cyprus may be admitted), the applicant 
states will be required to meet the criteria before joining the Union. Twelve applicants 
have started their accession talks. Turkey is the only country that does not meet enough 
of the Copenhagen Criteria to start talks. It is arguable whether countries like Bulgaria or 
Romania meet all the criteria or not. However, their accession talks are already on the 
way. Turkey is being asked to qualify on the criteria first. The Turkish side argues that 
Turkey is discriminated against with regard to accession talks and that Turkey should be 
able to start talks before meeting the criteria like other applicants. 8 
In 1993, the European Council met in Copenhagen and decided on the accession 
criteria for any European country wanting to join the EU. The decision was basically 
made for the central and eastern European states, in order to prepare them for full 
8 Turkish daily Sabah, 15 December 1997, p . l. 
3 
membership. The criteria, however, applied to all candidate states. 9 The accession criteria 
are called the Copenhagen Criteria due to the fact that the decision to apply them was 
made at Copenhagen. Once the criteria are met, enlargement is in principle no longer a 
question of "if' but "when". Full membership will take place as soon as an applicant is 
able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political 
conditions required. 10 
The membership criteria that are referred to as the Copenhagen Criteria have two 
separate parts: economic criteria and political criteria. Economically, the criteria require 
that the candidate country has achieved a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
Politically, the candidate state is required to achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, observance of the rule of law, respect for human rights, and respect for and 
the protection of minorities. In addition to the economic and political criteria, it is 
required that the applicant state must have the ability to take on the obligations of 
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
Lastly, the membership criteria require the applicant state to create the conditions for its 
integration through the adjustment of its administrative structures. 11 The most important 
requirements are the fulfillment of the economic and political criteria. 
9 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, available from 
http://www. europa. eu. inti comm/ enlargementlintro/index.htm 
10 loc. cit. 
11 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, available from 
http://www. europa. eu. inti comm/ enlargementlintro/ criteria.htm 
12 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey's relations with a changing Europe, (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1997), 3 
4 
1.2 Format 
The second chapter of the thesis provides the historical background for the 
relations between the European Union and Turkey. This chapter covers all the steps taken 
by the EU and Turkey and provides a base for the assumptions made about future 
relations. The historical steps by the two parties provide evidence of the importance of 
Turkey to the European Union and Turkey's willingness to become a member of the 
European Union as well. Turkey's geopolitical location throughout history is the most 
significant reason for the EU to include the country as a candidate. 12 Turkey is one of the 
most important actors of Southeast Europe, where it lies in the triangle of the Middle East, 
the Caucasus and the Balkans. Therefore, its geopolitical location has significant 
importance for the EU, which wants influence in the region. Turkey, on the other hand, 
needs to become a member of such an organization. Turkey seeks full membership within 
the EU, not only due to the economic advantages it might bring, but also to solve its 
identity problem of where it belongs. Moreover, no single state can resist the effects of 
globalization in the age of growing international cooperation. 
The third chapter discusses the European identity of Turkey. Although Turkey 
considers itself a European state, most other European states perceive Turkey as having a 
non-European culture due to cultural and religious differences. 13 Turkey is one of the 
founding members of the Council of Europe and geographically at least part of its 
territory belongs to the European continent. Morocco's application in 1987 to join the EU 
was rejected due to the fact that Morocco is not situated in Europe, but Turkey's 
13 Euractiv, "New challenges in the relations between the EU and Turkey", available from 
http: //www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/eurb/cgint.exe/89169?714& 10 15=3& 10 14=editorial#T50 
5 
application has never been rejected for geographical reasons. 14 The identity issue arises 
from the religious and cultural characteristics of the country, and goes back to its 
Ottoman Empire heritage. The word "European" conjures up an image of whiteness. 15 In 
addition, being "European" implies being Christian. Although there are an estimated 17 
million Muslims living within the European Union, some European politicians argue that 
Turkey's culture and religion constitute an obstacle for its future EU membership. As 
German sociologist Helmut Schmidt argues, "Turkey belongs to another world" . 16 This 
chapter demonstrates that Turkey and its culture belong to Europe. Turkey' s historical 
existence and cultural influence in Europe will be discussed and Turkey's European 
identity will also be examined. 
The fourth chapter examines Turkey with reference to the economic section of the 
Copenhagen Criteria. The economic criteria require candidates to have functioning free 
market economies. The Copenhagen Criteria also require each candidate state to have the 
ability to take on the obligations of membership. The chapter discusses the economic 
conditions of Turkey and examines the strengths and weaknesses of Turkey with respect 
to the EU's economic criteria. The argument here is that the economic conditions of 
Turkey depart from the EU average and that Turkey faces major difficulties in the 
econom1c area. 
The fifth chapter discusses the most problematic issues - the political obstacles 
Turkey has to deal with in order to start negotiation talks and, eventually, become a full 
14 A Concise Encyclopaedia of the European Union, available from http: //www.euro-
know.org/dictionary/m.html 
15 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, "Islam and Euro-identity: Muslims, diversity and inclusion", Demos Collection 
Issue 13 (1998): 38. 
16 Gtiray bz, "<;agimizin 'postmodem' bir kahramani", Cumhuriyet, 8 January 2001. 
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member. In this chapter, respect for human rights, the constitutional role that the army 
plays in political life through the National Security Council (through which military 
officials are involved in civil policies of government), and the Kurdish question are given 
specific attention. Exercise of torture in Turkey and the Cyprus dispute also have a direct 
impact on Turkey-EU relations and are discussed in a detailed way. This chapter argues 
that the political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria is the most significant challenge that 
Turkey has to face in terms of fulfilling the requirements ofthe Criteria on its way to full 
membership. 
The final chapter examines the importance of Turkey and the European Union for 
each other, along with positive and negative aspects of Turkish integration for both sides. 
This chapter concludes that there are economic and political reasons for the EU to delay 
Turkish entry to the Union. Moreover, the European Union may be biased towards 
Turkey regarding the issues of culture, religion and identity, which also make the Turkish 
application problematic for Europe. 17 The chapter argues that, given the security realities 
of Europe regarding Turkey's geopolitical location, the EU will never reject membership 
for Turkey; however, the economic and political problems of the country and its present 
inability to meet the Copenhagen Criteria will prevent its full membership in the near 
future. Given that the candidate states that have already entered into accession 
negotiations are not expected to be admitted into membership until 2005 at the earliest, 
and some not until 2010, it is clear that Turkish membership could not be approved 
within at least fifteen years. Under these circumstances, and given its present inability to 
17 David Goldblatt, "Global Flows: Cultural globalisation and the European project", Demos Collection 
Issue 13 (1998): 41. 
7 
fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, as well as its inherent cultural and religious differences 
with the rest of Europe, Turkey is unlikely to become a full EU member within twenty 
years. 
8 
J 
Chapter 2: Turkey and the European Union: A Historical Background 
2.1 Introduction 
Unlike any other applicant state' s relations with the EU, relations between Turkey 
and the European Union stretch back to the late 1950s, the years when the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed. Being part of European institutions was one 
ofTurkey' s steps towards westernization, which started with the formation of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923. 18 It is necessary to look at the history of Turkish-EU relations if one 
wants to make reasonable predictions for the future. After examining this history, the 
EU's enlargement aspirations, the effects of globalization on that process, and the 
importance of Turkey to the EU will be examined in order to understand the relations 
between Turkey and the European Union. 
2.2 Relations Between 1959-1986 
The Republic of Turkey, from the date of its formation, has always been western-
oriented. Turkey became a NATO member in 1952, and is one of the founding members 
of the Council of Europe. Turkey applied for membership in the European Economic 
Community (EEC) on July 131h, 1959, only one year after the establishment of the EEC. 
In 1963, after four years of negotiations, the Ankara Agreement was signed between 
Turkey and the EEC and it came into force on December 15\ 1964. 
The Ankara Agreement created an "association" between the two parties. The 
18 Statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Cern at the 54th Session of the UN General Assembly, "Turkey 
and Europe: Looking to the future from a Historical Perspective", available from 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/bf/Ol .htm 
9 
. 
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agreement aims to provide full membership for Turkey through a customs union, and 
draws the general framework for the relations between Turkey and the EEC. 19 The 
agreement's goal is "to ensure a continuing improvement in the Turkish economy and to 
reduce the economic disparities between Turkey and the Community". 20 In order to 
achieve these aims, this agreement provides for the gradual establishment of a customs 
union through the following three steps: the preparatory, the transitional, and the final 
step. The preparatory stage took five years and Turkey did not assume any obligations. 
The EEC established a foundation for a customs union during the transitional stage. The 
final stage concentrated on the customs union as well, providing closer coordination of 
economic policies. The most important article of the Ankara Agreement is Article 28. It 
states that when the process is advanced far enough, both the Community and Turkey 
will examine the possibility of Turkey 's accession to the Community. Thus, this is the 
article that foresees Turkey's full membership in the EEC.21 
The Ankara Agreement established the Association Council as the initiator of the 
relationship. The Council created three sub-committees: the Association Committee, the 
Customs Cooperation Committee and the Joint Parliamentary Commission. The 
Association Council is the highest decision-making body. It has the power to take binding 
and advisory decisions for the implementation and development of the association. It 
consists of the EEC member states ' government representatives and members from the 
Council and the Commission of the Community. The Turkish side is represented by 
members from the Turkish government. It convenes at least every six months at a 
19 Meltem Miiftiiler- Bac, Turkey's relations with a changing Europe, p. 56. 
20 loc. cit. 
2 1 loc. cit. 
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ministerial level. The Association Committee is the assistant body of the Association 
Council. It works on the 'technical' issues recommended by the Association Council. The 
Joint Parliamentary Commission is the inspecting body of the Association. Eighteen 
parliamentarians from the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the European 
Parliament make up the Commission. It convenes three times a year. It examines the 
annual report of the Association Council and makes recommendations for the 
implementation of the Association. The last institution, the Customs Cooperation 
Committee, is a technical committee. It establishes administrative cooperation between 
Turkey and the Community to ensure the implementation of the Association Agreement's 
provisions on issues related to customs. Members of the Customs Cooperation 
Committee consist of experts from the member states of the Community, the Commission, 
and Turkey. Its decisions are not binding. 
On December 23rd, 1970, Turkey and the EEC signed the Additional Protocol that 
went into force in 1973. The Additional Protocol describes the detailed rules and terms of 
the transitional stage, which was to be completed within 22 years. It aims to achieve the 
free circulation of industrial goods, persons, services, and capital between the 
Community and Turkey. The protocol also foresees the harmonization of the financial 
and commercial policies of the two parties. Establishment of a customs union between 
Turkey and the EEC is the final aim of the Protocol, as was stated in the Ankara 
Agreement. 22 
In the late 1970s Turkey - EEC relations slowed down for both economic and 
political reasons. Turkey became preoccupied with its domestic problems and neglected 
22 ibid. p. 59. 
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its relations with the European Community.23 Moreover, Turkey's Cyprus intervention in 
1974 reflected a 'barbarian' image for some Europeans, and also caused a conflict 
between Turkey and Greece (which became a full member of the Community in 1981 ). 
Also, with the oil crisis of the late 1970s, the member states of the Community adopted 
protectionist economic policies, which did not help to improve economic relations 
between the EEC and Turkey.24 
In 1980, military intervention took place in Turkey, which had a most adverse 
effect on Turkey' s relations with the EEC. Although the military regime indicated its 
willingness to carry on close relations with the Community, the EEC suspended relations 
with Turkey in 1981. Civil government with multi-party elections replaced the military 
regime in 1983. Relations remained chilled, however until the Association Council 
meeting in 1986. 
2.3 Turkey Applying For Full Membership in the European Community 
After the free elections of 1983 and 1986, Turkish society showed its willingness 
to preserve the democratic and secular principles of the state, and elected pro-European 
parties and politicians to the parliament. Turkey applied to the European Community (EC) 
for full membership on April 14th, 1987. Turkey's application for membership was not 
based on Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement. Turkey applied for membership according 
to Article 98 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC) and Article 205 
of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), both stating, "any democratic 
23 Ibid. p. 61. 
24 loc. cit. 
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European state may apply to become a member of the Community". 25 With this 
application, Turkey showed its determination to become a full member of the EC and 
provided evidence of Turkey's commitment to further adoption of the western values of 
democracy and a liberal economy. 
After Turkey's formal application, the European Commission evaluated the 
application, presented its report in 1989, and in 1990 accepted Turkey as "eligible" for 
membership. It also emphasized the importance of the completion of the Single Market 
and stated that the Community could not start accession negotiations with Turkey before 
the completion ofEC's internal market.26 It mainly paid attention to the internal problems 
of the Community as well as Turkey's inefficiencies in economic, political, and social 
realms. The European Community perceived Turkey's integration at the time as 
something that would slow down the economic and monetary union that had been 
planned within the Community. In addition, the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese 
accessions created huge economic problems, since these countries were relatively poorer 
than the rest of the members. Hence, Turkey was going to be another "headache zone" if 
it was admitted at that time. 
The report recognized that important progress had been achieved in Turkey since 
1980, especially in economics. However, despite positive improvements, Turkey's 
political and economic situation at that time was not compatible with the Community. 
The EC was following another approach to applications for full membership. In the 
Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese case, the method it followed was to admit first and then 
25 European Union-Turkey Relations, "Commission opinion on Turkey's request for accession to the 
Community", available from http://www.eureptr.org.tr/english/opinion.html 
26 Joe. cit. 
13 
to improve the conditions within the Community with the help provided by the EC to 
these countries. However, the approach to the Turkish application was to require Turkey 
to improve its situation first and then admit the country to the Union. This approach could 
be explained in part by the difficulties the EU faced during Greek, Spanish and 
Portuguese integrations. 
Among the economic difficulties that Turkey had to overcome in order to start 
accession talks were major structural disparities in agriculture and industry, macro-
economic imbalances, high levels of industrial protectionism, and finally a low level of 
social protection. The report also included the Community's concerns about Turkey's 
problems with democratization and human rights. 27 In its conclusion, the report suggested 
that the Community's future relations with Turkey should be based on the existing 
Association Agreement which reserves Turkey's right to full admission to the community 
in the future. The report also recommended that the Community propose to Turkey a 
series of substantial measures for increased cooperation within the framework of the 
Ankara Agreement. The focus of the measures was the completion of the customs union, 
the intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological 
cooperation, and the strengthening of political and cultural links. 28 
2.4 Relations in the 1990s 
Turkey's application for membership to the Community indicates a new phase of 
relations between the EC and Turkey. The Commission prepared a cooperation program 
called "the Matutes Package" and submitted it to the Council in 1990. Its aim was 
27 loc. cit. 
28 loc. cit. 
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primarily economic. It proposed the completing of the customs union by the end of 1995, 
increasing co-operation on issues related to the customs cooperation, resuming and 
intensifying financial cooperation, and enhancing political cooperation for greater 
alignment between Turkey and the EC.29 
In 1992, following the meetings between the Community and Turkey, the two 
parties agreed on increased cooperation, including completion of the process for 
becoming a member of the customs union, economic and financial cooperation, free 
movement of persons and services, competition, taxation and approximation of laws. 
Although the cooperation envisaged was mostly in the economic field, the parties also 
decided to increase the level of political dialogue to the highest degree when necessary. A 
Steering Committee was set up in 1993 to monitor and encourage progress towards the 
completion of the customs union. 
Signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 pushed relations between Turkey and 
Europe to a very crucial stage. With the Maastricht Treaty, the Community completed its 
internal market and was heading towards further economic and political co-operation. 
After this treaty was signed, the EU was to decide on the conditions of its next step 
towards enlargement. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communism in Eastern 
Europe, the Community had the chance to include the Central and Eastern European 
States in the Union. Turkey considered itself the most eligible state for the enlargement, 
as it had applied for full membership before all these newcomers. 30 However, the 
Commission, in its enlargement report of 1992, indicated that the accession negotiations 
with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, (Switzerland, Norway, Austria, 
29 Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations between Turkey and the European Union", 
available from http: //www .rnfa.gov. tr/grupa/ad/adab/relations.htrn 
15 
Sweden, and Finland) could begin as soon as the Maastricht Treaty was ratified by the 
Member states. There was no mention of the possibility of Turkey's full membership, 
only a statement indicating the Union's willingness to increase cooperation with 
Turkey. 31 This report implied Europe's umeadiness to include Turkey, in that it focused 
on carrying on economic relations without integration. 
In March 1995, the EU-Turkish Association Council decided to conclude the 
customs union between Turkey and the EU. Also, the Council adopted a resolution for 
the further development of relations in other aspects of the Association. The customs 
union came into force on January 15\ 1996. In addition to this, the EU issued a 
declaration concerning financial cooperation with Turkey. The customs union marks the 
most important achievement between Turkey and the EU. 
After the launch of the customs union, Turkey thought full membership was the 
next step, and assumed it would take place within a couple of years. However, the 
Commission report titled "Agenda 2000" proposed a number of measures aimed at the 
accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus, but excluded the 
Turkish application. Instead, it submitted a communication to the Council that mainly 
emphasized improving and deepening the customs union. 32 At the Luxembourg Summit 
held in December 1997, the EU decided to launch the accession process with the ten 
30 loc. cit. 
3 1 Luxembourg European Councils, "Luxembourg presidency B4-1048, 1094, 1095 and 1096/97 
Resolution on the conclusions ofthe Luxembourg European Council of21 November and 12 and 13 
December 1997 and on the term of office of the Luxembourg Presidency", available from 
http ://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/positionep/resolutions/181297 _ en.htm 
32 Europe's Agenda 2000, "Strengthening and Widening the European Union", available from 
http:/ I europa. eu.int/ comm/ agenda2000/pub lie_ en. pdf 
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Central and Eastern European applicants and Cyprus, leaving Turkey outside the 
. 33 accessiOn process. 
That was perceived as discrimination by the Turkish government. Moreover, the 
inclusion of the divided island of Cyprus in the process caused strong reactions from the 
Turkish side. 34 Consequently, in a statement made by the Turkish government following 
the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey announced that it would maintain existing association 
relations with the EU, but that the development of these relations was dependent on the 
EU' s fulfillment of its previous commitments. Hence, Turkey decided to freeze its 
political relations with the Union until any improvement in the candidacy status of 
Turkey had been made. 35 Relatively positive developments occurred during the Cardiff 
and Vienna Summits in 1998, creating a "European Strategy" towards Turkey. However, 
the strategy lacked a clear political message for Turkey; thus Turkey's policy of "no-
talks" with the EU was still in effect. 
The meeting of the EU foreign ministers that took place in Saariselka, Finland, 
after the seriously destructive earthquake of August 1999 in Turkey, adopted a new 
attitude towards Turkey's application for full membership. In the "Progress Report" 
published by the European Commission, the suggestion was to recognize Turkey's status 
as a full candidate. This suggestion was formally made at the Helsinki Summit in 
December 1999. 36 The official acknowledgement of Turkey's candidacy could be 
explained by Turkey's growing strategic importance which will be examined in the third 
33 Luxembourg European Councils, "Luxembourg presidency B4-1048, 1094, 1095 and 1096/97 
Resolution on the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council of 21 November and 12 and 13 
December 1997 and on the term of office of the Luxembourg Presidency", available from 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/positionep/resolutions/181297 _ en.htm 
34 Turkish daily Sabah, 15 December 1997 
35 loc. cit. 
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chapter. The 1999 earthquakes started a new friendship era between the old enemies: 
Greece and Turkey. Greece is no longer an obstacle against Turkey' s application to 
become a full member in the European Union (The role of the Cyprus dispute will be 
given attention in the fifth chapter). 
Turkey perceived the Helsinki Summit decisions as a historic victory for its 
Westernization process, a decision that would help Turkey acquire full membership in the 
EU. The final official declaration of candidacy status led the national newspapers to write 
' everything changed in a night' and Turkey suddenly became European. One of the 
biggest national newspapers, Hurriyet, gave almost half of its first page to that decision 
with the title "The Wind of Turkey". Commenting that Turkey is in the European 
photograph after 36 years (referring to the 1963 Ankara Agreement) it displayed the 
photograph of state leaders including Turkey's prime minister in Helsinki . 37 Another 
national paper, Sabah, publishing a special report on the decision, commented with large 
type and with the same photograph published in Hurriyet: "This is the photograph of our 
adoption into Europe". 38 Another paper, Milliyet, quoted the Prime Minister's words 
"The membership is not far". 39 The atmosphere among the media and Turkish 
government officials was very optimistic, and even the Turkish Prime Minister, Biilent 
Ecevit, stated that Turkey was going to achieve full membership status before the year 
2004.40 
36 European Union Enlargement, "A Historic Opportunity", available from 
http://www. europa. eu. int/ comm/ enlargement/ docs/pdf/ corpusen. pdf, p. 3 1 
37 Turkish daily Hiirriyet, 14 December 1999, p. 1. 
38 Turkish daily Sabah , 14 December 1999, p. 1. 
39 Turkish daily Milliyet, 14 December 1999, p. 1. 
40 Turkish daily Sabah , 13 December 1999, p . 1. 
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2.5 Relations in the 2000s 
It did not take Turkey too long to realize that full membership in the Union was 
still actually very far away. As a result of achieving official candidacy status, the 
pressures on Turkey to take some measures on its human rights abuses and democratic 
problems reached their highest level. Turkey started to realize that its candidacy status 
was ' conditional'.4 1 The conditions to start accession talks for Turkey include not only 
the general criteria that are imposed on other candidates, but also resolution of the Cyprus 
issue. The inclusion of a Cyprus settlement among the requirements has caused reactions 
against the EU from both the Turkish media and official Turkish authorities. Turkey - EU 
relations could be categorized as love-hate; this was the beginning of another "hate" 
period, this time hailing from Turkey. 
Relations have remained frigid since then, and the Nice Summit of December 
2000 did not improve them any further. In December 2000, the EU declared its ten-year 
program which included twelve candidate states, but excluded Turkey. This program 
shows the EU' s future plans after its enlargement, including the determination of the 
number of parliamentarians coming from the candidates, and their share of votes within 
the Commission, etc.42 The EU justified Turkey's exclusion from this program by noting 
there were no accession talks between the sides, which clearly implied that the EU had no 
plans to include Turkey after all. 
Today, the relations between the EU and Turkey are still in the after-Nice Summit 
mode, which is not very promising for Turkey' s future membership. Turkey promised the 
Union that it would fulfill the requirements that were stated in the EU Commission's 
41 Miimtaz Soysal, "Kiskac;", Hurriyet, 26 September 2000. 
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November 2000 report on Turkey, by focussing on its political problems such as human 
rights and democracy. However, it is not expected that Turkey will be able to fulfill the 
criteria by the end of the year 2004 as the Turkish government promised. The additional 
requirements for Turkey, relating to the Cyprus issue, are matters of great concern within 
Turkey. More people are arguing, including high ranked military officials, that Turkey 
should give up its European adventure.43 (The military position on Turkey-EU relations 
will be examined in chapter five.) 
2.6 Enlargement and Turkey 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism offered a new challenge 
for the European Union: to unite the eastern and western halves of Europe. The EU has 
experienced four cases of enlargement in its history (Ireland, the UK, and Denmark in 
1973; Greece in 1981; Portugal and Spain in 1986; and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 
1995). However, enlarging towards eastern and southern Europe looks more problematic 
than the previous enlargements. Ten central and eastern European states are still in the 
process of transition both economically and democratically. The Greek, Spanish and 
Portuguese enlargements have not been easy for the European Union, but the gap 
between the members and applicants is even greater this time. Moreover, the current 
enlargement of the European Union is a controversial issue itself. The countries of the 
central region of the EU prefer a limited enlargement. 44 Countries like Greece and 
42 Nice European Council, "Text of the Treaty of Nice", available from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice _council/index_ en.htm 
43 Douglas Frantz, "Military Bestrides Turkey's Path to the European Union", The New York Times, 14 
January 2001. 
44 Frank Schirnmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union", International Organization, Winter 2001 , p. 49. 
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Portugal are worried about their share in the Union's budget after the inclusion of poorer 
central and eastern European countries. In addition to the central and eastern Europeans, 
Turkey is also on the waiting list, which makes this enlargement even more problematic 
for the Union. Turkey's features, its population, culture, economy, and democracy, make 
this state problematic for the Union. However, the EU does not want to leave Turkey out 
of the process due to the geopolitical importance of the country.45 Both Turkey and the 
EU have mutual interests in full membership, which will be examined in the final chapter. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
Turkey is the applicant state with one of the longest historical backgrounds with 
the European Union. The relations between the EU and Turkey have been very volatile, 
including both promising and disappointing periods throughout the history. Turkey has 
never lost its interest in EU membership, even though the Turkish government claims that 
Turkey is discriminated against in its application. The official declaration of Turkey's 
candidacy in December 1999 brought along the task of meeting the requirements of the 
EU. Following chapters will examine the Copenhagen Criteria and Turkey's position in 
reference to them. First, however, the matter of Turkey's character and identity will be 
examined. 
45 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey's relations with a changing Europe, p. 8. 
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Chapter 3: Identity: How European is Turkey? 
3.1 Introduction: Where is Europe? 
The identity of Turkey, whether European or Asian, has been a subject of debate 
for decades. Although Turkey is officially a candidate to join the European Union, there 
have been ongoing arguments as to whether Turkey belongs to Europe or to Asia. 46 
Whether Turkey is part of the European continent or not will be discussed in this chapter. 
In order to understand where Turkey belongs, one should look at the country's 
location and examine its past. Turkey, geographically, is a natural bridge between Europe 
and Asia, with territories on both continents. Turkey' s presence in Europe, through its 
predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, and the westernization of Turkey after the 
formation of the Turkish Republic, are the most significant developments that have made 
Turkey European. The debate about Turkey's European identity mainly results from its 
diverse cultural and religious background as opposed to geographical factors. Islam and 
its place in Europe are also an important part of Turkey's identity. 
Although Istanbul is considered the city that unites Asia and Europe, European 
borders are not absolute. It is not very obvious where Europe starts and where it ends. 
Drawing the western border of Europe does not seem problematic, as the Atlantic Ocean 
forms a natural border. However, drawing European borders in the east has always been 
problematic; not only are easy geographical indications lacking, but also cultural lines are 
not well defined. Today Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are considered European states; 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan became members of the Council of Europe recently.47 With 
46 ibid., p. 13. 
47 Turkish Cypriot News, available from http://www.trncwashdc.org/News/01 _ 01_26.html 26 January 2001. 
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the admission of countries to the Council of Europe that lie east of Turkey, 
geographically, Turkey as a whole arguably falls within the scope of Europe. Also, the 
geographical locations of some countries, such as Cyprus and Malta, suggest it is 
questionable whether they are Asian (Cyprus), or North African (Malta). However, due to 
the cultural similarities between these countries and Europe, their European allies never 
debate their identity. As candidate states to the EU, they have no concerns over their 
European identity. Given that non-European states cannot become members of the EU, 
Cyprus, Malta and Turkey are presumably considered European because all three 
countries are officially candidate states for full membership. In contrast, Morocco's 
application for membership in 1987 was simply rejected on the grounds that it is not 
located in Europe. 48 Therefore, concerns over whether Turkey belongs to the 
geographical entity known as Europe seem invalid, as Turkey's application was not 
opposed due to its location. 
The Economist magazine argues that Turkey is a "limit case" for the European 
Union.49 Turkey is a limit case both because of its different cultural background and its 
geographical location. Turkey's geographical location lies among the most troubled 
regions of the world: the Balkans, Russia, the Middle East, and the Central Asian 
republics of the former Soviet Union. The Economist claims that Turkey's application 
will 'test and define' the EU's sense of its own identity. When considering Turkey's 
status, the EU will have to consider where Europe's ultimate border lies. 50 The 
Economist argues that Turkey is one of the marginal European countries along with 
48 A Concise Encyclopaedia of the European Union, available from http://www.euro-
know.org/dictionary/m.html 
49 "Turkey: Atatiirk's long shadow, A special report", The Economist, June lOth - 16th 2000, p. 74. 
50 Joe. cit. 
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Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. The "limit case" thesis of The Economist overlooks one 
important feature, which is Turkey's long history of association with the European Union. 
Putting Turkey in the same category as the Ukraine or Russia is not very appropriate, as 
these countries have no ongoing accession strategy to become part of the European Union. 
Turkey was one of the first states to be accepted officially as an applicant to join the 
European Union, unlike Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. 
Being part of Europe cannot be explained only by geography or drawing 
boundaries. Belonging to Europe means being part of Europe historically rather than just 
being a country on the map of the European continent. Albania, which is a country in the 
heart of Europe, is the best example of the phenomenon ofbeing European. Albania lacks 
the institutional ties with the European Union that Turkey has, which makes Turkey more 
European than this country. Hence, being European cannot be explained only by location. 
Historical existence and an active involvement in European affairs are crucially important 
in terms of being European. Although Turkey's European territories do not exceed 10% 
of its whole area, historically Turkey was considered a European state. It was, for 
example, formally acknowledged in the Paris Conference in 1856.51 
3.2 Turkey in Europe: A Historical Perspective 
The Turkish/Ottoman presence in Europe during the 15th, 16th and 1 ih centuries 
marks a period of much interaction between the Turks and the rest of Europe. The 
51 Address by H.E. Suleyman Demirel, 8th President of the Republic of Turkey, to the Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, April1999, available from 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/TIJRKHABER/1999/03mayis/TI.htm 
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Ottoman civilisation and its values helped in the transformation of Europe from the 
Middle Ages into modem times. 52 The Ottoman Empire, which lasted for more than 600 
years, had territories on three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. Its Islamic traditions 
and culture can be felt even today in Europe. The Ottomans' European existence started 
with the conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453. Suleyman the Magnificent then 
moved to the north in 1521 and captured Belgrade. He continued his invasions and added 
the Kingdom of Hungary to this empire. Ottomans twice laid siege to Vienna. Although 
the Ottoman Empire lost most of its Balkan territories during the 1880s, then the rest with 
the end of World War I, Turkey as the successor state still lies both on the European 
continent (i.e. eastern Thrace, west of Istanbul) and on Asian minor (Anatolia). The 
Muslims in Bosnia are the descendants of the Ottoman presence in the western Balkans. 
After the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey transformed itself into a modem 
European nation-state within fifteen years under the leadership of its founder, Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk. He replaced an absolute monarchy with a democratic republic, an Islamic 
ethos with secularism, an inefficient administrative system with a centralized bureaucracy, 
and an agrarian economy with an increasingly urban and industrial society. Especially 
after the formation of the Republic, Turkey became an increasingly complex, modem, 
pluralistic, urban, and industrial society with influences from Europe. 53 Civil society 
made significant improvements and democracy became a way of life for the nation. 
Turkey was also among the pioneers in Europe in terms of democracy with gender 
52 Statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cern at the 54th session of the UN General Assembly, 
"Turkey and Europe: Looking to the Future from a Historical Perspective", available from 
http://www.mfa.gov .tr/grupb/bf/0 l .htrn 
53 Mel tern Muftiiler-Bac, Turkey's relations with a changing Europe, p. 17. 
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equality, women's right to vote, secularism, upward mobility, etc. For instance, Turkish 
women were among the first in Europe to obtain the right to vote (in 1934). 
The founder of the Turkish Republic implemented a series of reforms in the 1920s 
and 1930s. The reforms were mainly attempts to secularize the state, and to remove 
religious elements. Ataturk deposed the Sultan and transformed Turkey into a western 
type republican system of political authority. He abolished the caliphate (the central 
source of religious authority), ended traditional education and religious ministries, and 
abolished separate religious schools and colleges. Instead of a religious education system, 
Atatiirk established a unified secular system of public education. A new legal system 
based on the Swiss civil code replaced the religious courts that applied Islamic law. The 
Gregorian calendar also replaced the traditional calendar, and Islam was formally 
disestablished as the state religion. 54 The use of the fez for men and headscarf for women 
were prohibited because they were symbols of religious traditionalism; instead people 
were encouraged to wear hats. Another major reform was made with regards to the 
written language of the Turks. The Roman alphabet was introduced instead of Arabic 
script. What Ataturk attempted to do was redefine the national, political, religious and 
cultural identity of the Turkish people. 55 Ataturk pointed to 'the west' as the civilization 
of which Turkey was going to be part. 56 'The west' at that time was the European 
civilization. Turkey broke off its links with the rest of the Muslim world and turned its 
54 loc. cit. 
55 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996), p. 144. 
56 "Atatiirk's speech on the occasion of lOth anniversary of the Turkish Republic, 1933", available from 
http://ataturk.turkiye.org/onyil!onyil.htm 
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face to the west. 57 Promoting western identity to a population that was vastly Muslim 
was the biggest challenge that the Republic of Turkey has ever faced. 
Before the Second World War, Turkey established a Balkans entente in 1936, 
and signed a treaty of alliance with Britain and France in 1938. After the Second World 
War, Turkey continued to follow other Western models. A competitive party system 
replaced one party rule. In 1949, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe, 
which was the first European international organization aimed at creating a union in 
Europe.58 Furthermore, Turkey signed the North Atlantic Treaty and became an ally of 
the west under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During the Cold War Era, 
Turkey was the eastern bulwark of containment, the country that blocked the spread of 
Soviet influence into the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. 59 Finally, 
in 1963, Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement with the European Community (EC) that 
sought to prepare Turkey for full membership in the EC. 
3.3 The Post Cold War Era 
According to international political theory, a country's power and position within 
the global system depend in part on its geographical position.60 During the post cold war 
era, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey was no longer one of the most 
important allies of the west. Huntington explains as follows : Turkey became "a less-
important ally against less-important threats coming from the South".61 The Gulf War 
57 Hussain Amjad, "Has The European Union Become A Christian Club?" The Wisdom Fund, 1997. 
58 Seyfi Tashan, "A Turkish perspective on Europe-Turkey relations on the eve of the IGC", available from 
http:/ /foreignpolicy. org. tr/ing/files/Tashan.html 
59 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 144. 
60 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey's Relations With a Changing Europe, p. 2. 
6 1 Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 145. 
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: 
: 
provides the best example of that alignment. Turkey provided crucial help against Iraq. It 
shut down the pipeline across its territory through which Iraqi oil reached the 
Mediterranean, and it permitted American planes to operate against Iraq from bases in 
Turkey.62 The Iraqi threat however was a less important threat for the west than the threat 
from the Soviet Union during the cold war. 
Apart from a change in the balance of power, the end of cold war era led to a rise 
in the argument that 'Europe belongs to Europeans', which means Europe belongs to the 
Christian civilization.63 Journalist Erol Manisali argues that, during elections in the mid 
and late 1990s, anti-immigrant party votes rose in almost all EU member states including 
France, Belgium, Denmark and Austria. In addition, the Christian churches have gained 
much importance and power during last twelve years in Europe. 64 Manisali claims that, as 
a result of the changing balances in the European sphere, relations with Turkey gained 
new momentum. Turkey was kept tied to Europe economically but not given full 
membership due to religious differences and a reluctance to accept "the other" in 
Europe. 65 However, his argument is very hard to prove, that is, whether the EU 
discriminates against Turkey on the basis of its religion or not. Moreover, it is a fact that 
Turkey does not meet the Copenhagen Criteria both economically and politically, and 
that alone could explain the delay in its membership (rather than the religious and cultural 
concerns). Claims that religious discrimination is a problem would, however, be more 
credible if the EU does not include Turkey when the criteria are met. 
62 loc. cit. 
63 ibid., p.146. 
64 Erol Manisali, "Fransa'dan Tiirkiye'ye Bakarken", Cumhuriyet, 24 January 2001. 
65 loc. cit. 
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The collapse of communism meant that Turkey's place in Europe had to be re-
evaluated.66 European politicians started to argue that Turkey's strategic location was less 
important for the west, as there was no longer a communist threat to the "capitalist" 
countries of the region. 67 The Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the conflict in the Caucasus, the 
emergence of the resource-rich Central Asian republics, and the civil war in the former 
Yugoslavia have all demonstrated that the importance of Turkey is not limited only to 
traditional East-West related issues. 68 President Bill Clinton, who visited Turkey in 
November 1999 during the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
summit in Istanbul, emphasized Turkey's importance for the region and for the world as 
follows : 
The future can be shaped for the better if Turkey can fully become a part of 
Europe, as a stable, democratic, secular, Islamic nation. And if there is a real 
vision on the part of our European allies, who must be willing to reach out and 
believe that it is in Turkey where Europe and the Muslim world can meet in peace 
and harmony, to give us a chance to have the future of our dreams in that part of 
the world in the new millennium. 69 
After Clinton's speech, Turkey was officially declared a candidate state for full 
membership in EU' s December 1999 Helsinki Summit. The decision may have been in 
part due to the realisation of Turkey's strategic importance by the European Union, and 
to the sort of support reflected in Clinton's OSCE summit argument. 
66 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey 's Relations With a Changing Europe, p. 4. 
67 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 145 
68 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey 's Relations With a Changing Europe, p. 4. 
69 Speech delivered by Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik at Conrad Adenauer Foundation, "The perspective of 
wholeness: The new century and Turkey in Europe", available from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupblbi/Ol.htm 
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3.4 Turkey: 'A Tom Country'? 
According to Samuel Huntington's thesis in the book, Clash of Civilizations, the 
post cold war period features a division of the world along religious and cultural rather 
than ideological lines. 70 Religion, values, customs and ethnicity are the elements that 
make up civilizations. Huntington defines Turkey as a 'tom country' .71 A tom country 
has origins in one civilization but chooses to move to another. Turkey is a country with 
its origins in the Islamic civilization which chose to move into the western civilization. 
There are three requirements that have to be fulfilled to redefine a "tom" country's 
identity. First, the political and economic elite must support the realignment. Second, the 
masses have to accept the move. And finally, the host civilization must embrace the 
convert. 72 According to Huntington, Turkey has no problem in fulfilling the first two 
criteria. However there is not yet acceptance from the west of Turkey, or of Turkey's 
application for full membership in the European Union. Huntington's third argument may 
yet be met, as evidenced by the 1999 Helsinki Summit decision of the European Union, 
where Turkey was officially declared a candidate state to join the Union. The decision 
shows recognition from Europe. 
It is now up to Turkey to achieve membership status. Turkey should be able to 
join the Union as soon as it fulfills the Criteria. Huntington argues, however, that being 
European means being part of the Christian tradition and this condition will prevent 
Turkey from being part of Europe. Huntington draws the map of Europe according to 
religion and claims that "Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam 
70 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 28. 
71 ibid. , p.138 
72 ibid., p.146. 
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begins".73 The Helsinki decision of the EU suggests an opposite view as it gave a Muslim 
state official candidacy status. This action suggests Europe does not end where Islam 
begins (i.e., at the borders of Turkey). 
Huntington's argument reflects the statements of some European politicians about 
Turkey and its place in Europe. The question is: does Islam begin with Turkey? Despite 
the generalization that Europe consists of Christian countries, there are large numbers of 
Muslims living in Europe. The Muslim population is around 43% in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 74 There are an estimated five million Muslim Turks living all over Europe. 
Moreover, Muslim groups represent the biggest minority in some countries. For instance, 
Turks are the biggest minority group in Germany; there have been an estimated 3 million 
Turks living in Germany for more than three decades now. 75 Greece is another EU 
member state that hosts a large Muslim population -- Turks in Western Thrace. Turks are 
not the only Muslims in Europe. Algerians and other North Africans in France, and 
Pakistanis in the United Kingdom, are the other major Muslim groups that contribute 
their civilization to Europe's culture. There are approximately seventeen millions 
Muslims living in Europe. Thus, Huntington's argument ignores the realities of today's 
Europe; however, it describes the perceived identities in Europe. 
3.5 Fear of Islam in Europe? 
Turkey, lying in the triangle of the unstable Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East, 
has turned its face to the west during the last 500 years of its history. Despite the 
73 loc. cit. 
74 Judy Ball and Feister John Bookser, "A complicated and bloody conflict", available from 
http:/ /users. ao 1. com/rirnac/bosfra!judy .htm 
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disadvantages of its democratic and economic conditions, the choice for Turkey has 
always been the West, unlike other Muslim countries. Opposition to Turkish membership 
in the EU is mainly centered on human rights and economic development. Turkish 
President Ozal, however, claimed in 1992 that: "Turkey's human rights record is a made-
up reason why Turkey should not join the European Community. The real reason is that 
we are Muslim, and they are Christian". He added "but they don't say that" .76 Huntington 
argues that European officials confronted his argument and agreed that the Union is ' a 
Christian club ' and "Turkey is too poor, too populous, too Muslim, too harsh, too 
culturally different, too everything". 77 Moreover one observer commented that the 
historical memory is of "Saracen raiders in Western Europe and the Turks at the gates of 
Vienna". 78 These views reflected the common perception among Turks that "the west 
sees no place for a Muslim Turkey within Europe". 79 Whereas, with the realization of 
Turkey' s strategic location (that its importance is not only limited to the Communist 
threat), the previous comments regarding "Europe sees no place for a Muslim Turkey" do 
not reflect reality anymore. Turkey is an official candidate to join the EU. 
Europe is made up of different cultures and religions. Some European politicians 
refer to Islam as non-European and that affects their view on Turkey's application to the 
EU. For instance, the ex-chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl, claims that Turkey will 
never be able to join the EU due to its religious characteristics. 80 The president of the 
European Union of Christian Democrats stated that the EU had "cultural, humanitarian 
75 "Turks in the European Union", available from 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/NEWSPOT/2000/May/N24.htrn 
76 Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, p. 146 
77 loc. cit. 
78 loc. cit. 
79 loc. cit. 
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and Christian values different to Turkey's". 81 Former Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van 
Mierlo, stated that "There is a problem of a large Muslim state. Do we want that in 
Europe? It is an unspoken question."82 Journalist Hussain Amjad explains the perceived 
bias against Turkey as follows: 
Somehow the Europeans have always been paranoid about Islam and its followers. 
It has more to do with European insensitivity towards Muslims than Islamic 
identity of Turkey. 83 
Therefore, it is a fact that some European politicians consider the Turkish 
application to join the EU problematic due to religious differences. However, it is more 
difficult to prove these differences are part of the official attitude of the EU towards 
Turkey. While certain politicians express their reluctance over Turkey's membership in 
the Union, the EU, on the other hand, has officially declared Turkey "a future member". 
Hence, what some European politicians believe cannot be associated with the official 
policies of the European Union is taking place. 
In addition to religious concerns, some in the European Union who are against 
Turkish full membership tend to imply that the Turkish culture is an obstacle for 
integration. For instance, the Christian Democrats of the European Parliament stated that 
"Turkey cannot be accepted by the EU on cultural and religious grounds". 84 This 
argument here seems no more valid than the one on religion. In order to understand 
Turkish culture and how European it is, the sceptics do not need to look too far. There is 
8° Ciineyt Arcayiirek, "Ya Ak ya Kara mi?'', Cumhuriyet, 15 January 2001 
8 1 U.S. Department of State, Daily press briefmg, 7 March 1997, available from 
http:/ I secretary. state. gov /www /briefings/97 03/97 03 07 .html 
82 Human Rights World Watch Report 1998, "Turkey Human Rights Developments", available from 
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport!Helsinki-23 .htm 
83 Hussain Amjad, "Has The European Union Become A Christian Club?", the Wisdom Fund, 1997, 
available from http: //www.twf.org/News/Y1997 /ChristianClub.html 
84 Athens News Agency, "Kohl Urges Turkey to improve relations with Greece", 1 October 1997. 
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one member state of the EU whose culture is almost the same as Turkey' s: Greece. The 
people of the two nations on different sides of the Aegean Sea not only look alike 
physically, but also listen to the same music, eat the same food, and even drink the same 
drink under different names - Ouzo in Greece and Raki in Turkey. These two nations, 
that lived together under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, share a common 
culture and habits, except for their religious practices. It is often easy to distinguish an 
Englishman from a Swede. However if someone saw two men, one Greek and the other 
one Turk, the observer would rarely be able to be sure who was which. 85 
Correspondingly, the Turkish and Greek cultures have more similarities with each other 
than the Swedish and English cultures. The argument that "Turkey belongs to another 
cultural world", or that Turkey belongs to the "other" category due to its culture, IS 
misleading. The EU already has a culturally similar nation to Turkey in its midst. 
3.6 Ongoing Discrimination? 
Turkish politicians claim that Turkey has been treated differently than other EU 
applicant countries, especially during the 1990s. 86 With the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the eastern and central European states started to sign association agreements with 
the EU and their full membership will be concluded within ten years, according to the 
Nice Summit of2000. However, Turkey, which signed an association agreement in 1963, 
was excluded at Nice, which means that Turkey is the only applicant that will not be able 
to join the EU within ten years. Although Turkish politicians and journalists argue that 
85 Gunter Endruweit, "Turkey and the European Union: A Question of Cultural Difference?", Perceptions, 
Journal of International affairs, Volume III Number 2, June-August 1998, available from 
http: //www.rnfa.gov.tr/grupa!percept/lll-2/gunter.htm 
86 Turkish daily Sabah, 15 December 1997, p 1. 
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the reason for the exclusion is religious and cultural differences, the official reason seems 
to be Turkey' s lack of fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria. These criteria will be 
examined in the following chapters. 
The Davos Summit of 2001 m Switzerland involved important meetings and 
interactions among the member states and the candidate states of the Union. According to 
the speeches given in Davos (which occurred after Turkey had acquired its formal 
candidacy status in 1999), European politicians tended to refer to twelve countries, and 
counted the total number of countries after enlargement as twenty-seven. 87 Even though 
Turkey is one of the candidates and the European Union claims that there will be no 
discrimination against Turkey, some European politicians prefer not to include Turkey as 
one of the 'future members ' . Turkish authorities argued that the Nice Summit of 
December 2000 along with the speeches given in Davos were proof of that discrimination, 
as all applicants but Turkey were included in the ten-year enlargement plans. 88 On the 
other hand, some of these speeches were by European politicians (e.g., the Prime 
Minister of Bulgaria) who do not directly represent the official views of the European 
Union regarding Turkey's application. The exclusion of Turkey at the Nice Summit could 
also be explained by the lack of negotiation talks between Turkey and the Union at this 
stage. 
87 Turkish daily Sabah , 28 January 2001 , available from 
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3. 7 What Do People Think? 
Public opinion polls in Europe show that the citizens of the EU do not favour 
Turkey's full membership. Fully 47% are against Turkish integration into the EU. 89 
Support for Turkey's membership ranges from 20% in Germany to 44% in Ireland. 
Turkey is the least favoured applicant state according to the poll. The possibility of 
extensive migration from Turkey to European cities is the main fear of Europeans. 90 This 
strong opposition to Turkish membership and tendency to see Turks as 'the other' may 
also result from the historical invasions of Europe by the Ottomans. 
As a result of the demand for workers in Europe, a large number of Turkish 
workers emigrated to countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium during the 
1960s and 1970s. Turkish labour migration to the European Community countries 
increased sharply during late 1960s and, by the early 1970s, over 100,000 Turks annually 
were going abroad to work. Although the host countries originally admitted the workers 
temporarily, most of them preferred to stay and became permanent residents. Turks make 
up 24.4 per cent of all migrants to the European Union and form the largest of its migrant 
groups. 91 Turks leaving for Europe during the 1960s were unemployed and mostly 
uneducated people mainly from underdeveloped regions of Turkey. Having strong 
religious backgrounds and with the culture shock they faced in Western Europe, most of 
them still are not integrated into German or Dutch society. Non-integration has led to an 
increase in xenophobic incidents, such as that in 1992 in Solingen, Germany, which 
89 European Commission, "Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union", report number 52, 
April 2000, p. 58. 
90 Ciineyt Arcayiirek, "Ya Ak ya Kara mi?'', Cumhuriyet, 15 January 2001 
91 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey 's relations with a changing Europe, p. 19. 
92 ibid. , p.21. 
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resulted in the deaths of Turkish women and children. 92 Although the new generation is 
more integrated than the previous one, the problem of integrating Turks into European 
societies still exists. Few Europeans are aware of the westernized and educated portion of 
Turkish society that is very similar to western European society. The images of Turkey 
and Turks are shaped by what Western Europeans see everyday in their lives and these 
perceptions shape the foreign policies of states in today's world. 
Although the majority of Europeans do not favour Turkey's membership, Social 
Democrats of the European Parliament seem to favour Turkish integration into the EU. 93 
Christian Democrats generally oppose Turkey. Social Democrats argue that the European 
identity consists of common democratic values, the rule of law, and human rights. They 
argue that the EU is not a Christian club, and claim that Turkey will be part of the Union 
as soon as it meets the Copenhagen Criteria. However, Social Democrats cannot put their 
arguments as strongly as Christian Democrats do due to the fear of losing votes m 
national elections, by supporting something that many of their citizens oppose. 94 
On the Turkish side, surprisingly, the most Islamically inclined political party and 
columnists most in favour of Islamic rule in Turkey support European Union membership 
as much as any other pro-European political unit or group of intellectuals. It is very 
interesting to see support from these institutions and scholars, as they were strongly 
opposed to any kind of integration with Europe not more than ten years ago, and were 
insisting on integration with the Muslim world instead. What has changed? Due to the 
strong secularist measures that were taken by Turkish governments, such as preventing 
women from wearing headscarves in state buildings and in universities, and banning the 
93 Hasan Cemal, "Tiirkiye 'nin AB ile bilek giiresi", Milliyet, 30 January 2001. 
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country's most popular political party (the Welfare Party which got a majority of the 
votes in the 1995 elections, but was banned from political life due to acts against 
secularism), the anti-EU activists of the 1980s have become pro-European during the 
1990s. Islamic-led political parties and their supporters believe that EU membership 
would democratize Turkey and give them greater religious freedom. Hence, they support 
Turkey's full integration within the EU, as they believe it will actually support their 
religious practices. 95 
However, support of integration cannot be explained only from a democratization 
perspective. There is a growing feeling of 'being European', which can be observed at all 
levels of society. Most Turkish people support EU membership for Turkey -- 68.7% 
according to a survey conducted in September 2000. 96 There is thus an opportunity for 
the EU to include a country where the majority supports integration. Pro-EU support, 
even from forces that were anti-EU in the past, shows how Turkish society as a whole 
feels about where they belong. Although Turks feel both European and Asian, most see 
their future in Europe, including Turks who supported an Islamic Union of the Arab 
countries of the Middle East in the past. 
Born in Turkey and immigrated to the Netherlands when she was 6 years old, 
Nebahat Albayrak, an MP in the European Parliament representing the Netherlands, 
provides clear evidence that one can be Turk and be European at the same time. She 
argues that she does not understand when people ask her the question "Do you feel 
European?" She asks why she should not feel European if she is Turkish? She claims that 
she feels 100% percent Dutch and 100% percent Turkish, which means feeling 100% 
94 loc. cit. 
95 Mustafa Karaalioolu, "A vrupa yoksa duydu mu sesimizi?", Y eni Safak, 10 November 2000. 
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European. 97 She carries her argument further by stating that democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law are not exclusively European concepts. They are given priority in 
Europe, but that does not mean that you do not give the same priority to these concepts if 
you are not European. In short, there is no single European culture. It is not possible to 
create a common culture in the short-term so Europe will be a continent of different 
cultures in the future, including the Turkish. 98 
3.8 Turkey and the Arab World 
Huntington suggests Turkey was "rejected from Brussels, and rejected from 
Mecca" and asks, "where could Turkey go?" "Tashkent could be the answer", he says.99 
The problem with Huntington's answer is that while Turkey may be seen as non-
European by some Westerners, its eastern neighbors perceive Turkey as a nation not 
belonging to their civilization as well. Turkey, for the Arab world, is a country that is 
trying to be part of the west, and is alienated from Muslim civilization. Especially with 
the secular policies pursued after the formation of the Republic in 1923, Turkey put all of 
its effort into being part of Europe, and ignored the Arab World. Collaboration with the 
Christian West led to Muslim Middle Eastern countries accusing Turkey of being 
disrespectful to its cultural heritage. Muslim Arabs started to perceive Muslim Turkey as 
a non-Muslim nation because of its secular policies and willingness to be a part of 
Christian Europe. 
96 Turkish daily Milliyet, 9 September 2000. 
97 Nebahat Albayrak, "Kimlik Secilebilir Olmali", Guncel Haber, Issue 6, February 2000, p.4. 
98 loc. cit. 
99 Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, p. 146 
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One Turkish journalist, Serdar Turgut, provides an example of that perception 
from a visit to Dubai in 1991. According to the laws of the United Arab Emirates, 
Muslims are not allowed to drink alcoholic beverages. When Mr. Turgut and his 
colleagues were having a drink in one of Dubai' s bars, Arab police entered and checked 
for identification to see if there were any Muslims violating the law. A couple of 
customers from Pakistan were taken to the police centre. However, when the police 
checked the passports of the Turks, they let them keep drinking. 100 What Mr. Turgut and 
other journalists experienced shows the way Arabs perceive Turks. They do not accept 
Turks as Muslims. Turkey is a country that is in search of its cultural identity. 
Europe, on the one hand, perceives Turkey as non-European due to religious 
differences. On the other hand, the Muslim world perceives Turkey as an alien country 
because it is a secular state with westernized laws. Turkey does not belong to or share the 
Judea-Christian cultural tradition, but neither does it share or belong to the predominantly 
Arab Islamic culture. 101 
3.9 Conclusion 
It is ironic today that the European Union seems to be reluctant to include Turkey 
due to its perceived lack of democracy and political freedoms. Although Turkey has not 
been very successful in providing the democratic freedoms that European citizens enjoy 
today, its history proves that it has the capacity to provide more human rights for 
everyone in the near future. 
100 Serdar Turgut, "Meselelerimiz neden hit;: bitrniyor - 2", Hurriyet, 29 January 2001. 
101 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey 's relations with a changing Europe, p. 14 
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There are an estimated 17 million Muslims living within the European Union, but 
that does not change the fact that the EU consists of nations that are predominantly 
Christian. Turkey is the only Muslim candidate state, and thus the only Muslim state with 
a chance of joining the EU in the near future. The EU is not only a political and economic 
project but a cultural one as well. The possibility of including a non-Christian state is a 
real challenge as Europe faces the enlargement process. Although Turkish politicians 
argue that Turkey is discriminated against on the basis of its cultural and religious 
characteristics, it is not possible to prove religious discrimination on the basis of official 
European Union policies. There have been European politicians who claimed that 
Turkish integration with the EU was problematic for religious and cultural reasons. 
However, Turkey is officially a candidate state to join the Union and, like any other 
applicant state, it should normally start accession talks as soon as it meets the 
Copenhagen Criteria. 
Islam and Turkish culture have been part of Europe's culture throughout the 
centuries. It is a fact that there are EU politicians who demonstrate resistance to Turkish 
integration due to the fact that Turkey is Muslim. However, such differences already exist 
within Europe. Turkey's culture and religion will continue to be part of Europe whether 
Turkey is a member of the EU or not. The next enlargement of the EU would most likely 
mean that the unification of Europe is not concluded, if Turkey is not included. Hence, 
Turkey's full integration within Europe holds the opportunity to represent all the different 
cultures and religions that exist in Europe under the umbrella of the European Union. 
Turkey at this stage has to concentrate on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria in 
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order to hasten the integration with the European Union. The following chapters will 
examine Turkey with reference to the Copenhagen Criteria. 
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Chapter 4: Copenhagen Criteria and Turkey: Economic Section 
4.1 Introduction 
According to the 1999 edition of the European Commission's regular report on 
Turkey, the commission found that: 
Turkey has many of the characteristics of a market economy. It should be able to 
cope, albeit with difficulties, with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union, provided sustainable macroeconomic stability is attained and there is 
further progress towards the implementation of legal and structural reform 
programs. 102 
The Commission in its 2000 report on Turkey's progress towards accession also stated 
that Turkey has a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope "with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union". However, the main problem 
Turkey faces economically is a dependence on external aid. The Turkish economy, 
especially after the latest crisis when the Lira was devaluated by around 40% against the 
US dollar, is dependent on the IMF. 103 
A functioning market economy reqmres that pnces, as well as trade, are 
liberalized and that an enforceable legal system, including property rights, is in place. 
The criteria also imply a well-developed financial sector and the absence of any 
significant barriers to market entry and exit to ensure the efficiency of the economy. The 
current government has maintained an ongoing program covering all these essentials. 
Therefore, Turkey is in the process of fulfilling the economic section of the Copenhagen 
Criteria with assistance from the IMF. However, in order to start accession talks, Turkey 
should become less dependent economically. 
102 Turkey 2000, "2000 Regular Report from the commission on Turkey 's progress towards accession", 8 
November 2000, p.22. 
103 Staugustine: World News, "Turks to pay the big price for lira fall", available from 
http: //www.staugustine.com/stories/02240 1/wor _ 02240 I 00 16.shtml 
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4.2 The Turkish Economy 
According to the EU reports, the Turkish economy is improving. 104 The 1998 
consolidation program and the earthquakes of 1999 caused a sharp recession in the 
economy but Turkey is now experiencing a recovery process. The main problems of the 
Turkish economy are the chronically high inflation and interest rates and fiscal 
stabilization. The economic program of the government was successful in bringing down 
the inflation rate and reducing real interest rates during 1999 and 2000. Import growth 
was also very strong, especially in 2000. The government program, which is supported by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, also addresses the 
privatisation of state enterprises, and strengthening of the banking and agricultural sectors, 
as well as of the social security system. The privatization of state enterprises has been one 
of the most important reforms of the Turkish economy, as the enterprises have generally 
lost money (e.g., Turkish Airlines). There has been a sharp rise in private and public 
sector investment, reflecting declining financial costs (i.e., interest rates) and 
reconstruction after the earthquakes. Industrial production also rose by 3.4% during the 
first half of 2000. 105 
According to the European Commission's year 2000 regular report on Turkey, the 
most remarkable macroeconomic effect of the economic program of the government has 
104 Turkey 2000, "2000 Regular Report from the commission on Turkey's progress towards accession", 8 
November 2000, p.22. 
105 loc. cit. 
106 'b 'd 25 1 1 . , p. . 
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been the sharp decline in interests rates and the reduction in inflation. 106 Interest rates fell 
from around 100% at the end of 1999 to about 45% in mid-January 2000 and to around 
35% in mid-2000, after the announcement of the government program. Inflation, which 
had been around 80% during 1999, declined to 49% in September 2000, according to the 
twelve-month consumer price inflation rates. The 49% rate was the lowest value since the 
early 1990s. 107 The government aims at reaching single digit inflation by the end of2001. 
Moreover, Turkish imports increased in the first half of 2000, after a sharp decline in 
trade flows in 1999. Also, exports to the European Community increased by about 3% 
during 2000. 108 Despite improvement, these figures are still unacceptable to the European 
Union, and are not compatible with the average EU figures. Hence, Turkey has a long 
way to go to achieve macroeconomic stability. 
There are no major restrictions in Turkey in terms of market entry and exit. 
During the first half of the year 2000, about 27,500 new enterprises were established, 
which make up about 15% of the total number of enterprises. About 8300 enterprises 
were liquidated in the same period. According to the EU report, these numbers indicate a 
high turnover in the enterprise sector and an adequately functioning market exit 
mechanism. 109 
The Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU, which has been in 
force since December 31 5\ 1995, plays an important part in Turkish trade integration with 
the EU. The major economic effect of the customs union was a redirection of Turkish 
107 Turkey's Economy, Latest Turkish Economic Data/Statistics, available from 
http://www.geoinvestor.com/statistics/turkey/economicdata.htm 
108 Turkey 2000, "2000 Regular Report from the commission on Turkey's progress towards accession", 8 
November 2000, p.27. 
109 .b .d 30 1 1 ., p. 
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third-country imports towards the European Community. Turkish enterprises have 
experienced no major problems in adjusting to the new competitive situation. Trade 
integration between the EU and Turkey rose continuously after the customs umon 
agreement, reaching a trade share of more than 50% of Turkey's total trade with the 
Union.110 
The EU regular report of 2000 argues that an equilibrium between demand and 
supply is established by the free interplay of market forces and if commodity trade is 
liberalized. However, there are still considerable areas of state influence and non-market 
behavior. The state still owns a number of companies in basic industry sectors. These 
enterprises account for about eight per cent of GDP and employ about 400,000 persons. 
They are mostly over-staffed, inefficient, and owe their survival to state subsidies. The 
EU suggests that Turkey should continue to privatize the state owned industries and these 
enterprises should count for less than eight per cent of GDP .111 
A negative impact of the government's economic program is that unemployment 
m 1998 and 1999 has increased considerably. It reached its highest level since the 
financial cns1s m 1994. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
compatible survey, overall unemployment rose from 7.3% in April 1999 to 8.3% in the 
first quarter of 2000. There are huge differences in the unemployment rates between the 
urban areas, where they are above 10%, and rural areas with unemployment rates of 
around 5%.112 
110 loc. cit. 
111 Turkey's Economy, Latest Turkish Economic Data/Statistics, available from 
http://www.geoinvestor.com/statistics/turkey/economicdata.htm 
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4.3 Conclusion 
Even though the Turkish economy has senous macroeconomic problems, 
economically Turkey could be ready for full membership if the government program is 
followed strictly. The program to take the inflation rate down should be continued. Also, 
the influence of the state through state enterprises should be minimized and privatization 
should be carried out. Regional disparities are traditionally very high in Turkey, with a 
well-developed industrialized western part and a less developed predominantly rural 
eastern part. The state should give attention to the development of the east where there is 
no longer a terrorist threat from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Macroeconomic 
stability, also, is not yet achieved. There is still need for significant restructuring in 
various sectors, such as banking, agriculture and state enterprises. Dependence on foreign 
aid (i.e., support from the IMF), chronic high inflation and high unemployment rate are 
the major inefficiencies of the Turkish economy that prevent it from meeting the 
economic section of the Copenhagen Criteria. In order to fulfil the economic criteria, the 
government program should be supported, as it is aimed at assuring macroeconomic 
stability in the country. Turkey considers itself more eligible for full membership 
economically than politically. The political problems of Turkey will be examined in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Copenhagen Criteria and Turkey: Political Section 
5.1 Introduction 
The Copenhagen Criteria require that the candidate country achieve stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, adopt the rule of law, respect human rights, and 
ensure the protection of minorities. 113 The political requirements of the Copenhagen 
Criteria seem the most problematic for Turkey's integration. Turkey is the only candidate 
that does not meet the political criteria. It is therefore the only candidate that could not 
start accession talks. The main problems that Turkey faces with respect to the political 
criteria are related to the Kurdish question, the death penalty, torture, the military role in 
government policies through the National Security Council, and the 31ih article of the 
Turkish Criminal Law that limits freedom of speech. The European Commission's 2000 
Regular Report on Turkey describes Turkey's eligibility in terms of the political criteria 
as follows: 
Recent developments confirm that, although the basic features of a democratic 
system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria. There are 
serious shortcomings in terms ofhuman rights and protection of minorities. Torture is not 
systematic but is still widespread and freedom of expression is regularly restricted by the 
authorities. The National Security Council continues to play a major role in political life. 
Although there have been some improvements in terms of the independence of the 
judiciary the emergency court system remains in place. In recent months there have been 
some more encouraging signs of democratization. The government and Parliament have 
worked to adopt some key laws regulating political life, the justice system and protection 
of human rights. It is too early to assess the impact of these measures but these efforts 
should be pursued and extended to all citizens, including those of Kurdish origin. The 
113 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, available from 
http: //www.europa.eu.int/comrn/enlargement/intro/criteria.htrn 
114 Turkey 2000, "2000 Regular Report from the commission on Turkey ' s progress towards accession", 8 
November 2000. p. 10. 
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Commission hopes that the positive impact of these measures will not be undone by the 
carrying out ofthe death sentence passed on Mr. Abdullah Ocalan. 114 
Although the Cyprus dispute is not officially an obstacle for Turkey, it is expected 
that Turkey's full integration will not be a reality before the Cyprus dispute is solved. As 
Greece is already member of the European Union and has power to veto any applicant 
country's full membership, it is expected that Turkey's full membership would be vetoed 
by Greece if the dispute remains unresolved. Greece supports the application of Cyprus to 
join the EU and accuses Turkey of being responsible for the Cyprus conflict. Therefore, it 
does not seem possible for Turkey to become a full member before a solution achieved in 
the island. The Cyprus dispute will be examined in detail in this chapter. 
5.2 The Kurdish Question & the Death Penalty 
The European Union sees the Kurdish population of Turkey as an ethnic minority. 
The Turkish Government, however, refuses to accept them as such. According to post 
World War I agreements (i.e. the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923), Turkey only 
recognizes three religious minorities: Greek, Armenian, and Jewish. 11 5 Turkey does not 
recognize any ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Georgians, Abkhaz, Circassians, etc. The 
Kurds could integrate into the Turkish political system only if they saw themselves as 
Turks. 116 The Kurdish population of Turkey that makes up one-fifth of the population is 
not recognized as a minority. 117 The Kurds of Turkey are not recognised as a minority 
11 5 Mehmet Ali Kislali, "AB ve Azinliklar", Radikal, 18 February 2000. 
116 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey 's relations with a changing Europe, p. 89. 
11 7 Mehmet Ali Kislali, "AB ve Azinliklar", Radikal, 18 February 2000. 
11 8 Fehrni Koru, "Yasak 'dil' olur mu?", Yeni Safak, 13 April2000. 
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group, and nor is their language accepted; the Republic of Turkey recognises only the 
Turkish language. Kurdish is widely spoken especially in the southeast region of the 
country. The Kurds of Turkey however were never given the right to education in their 
own language, and during 1980s the Kurds were not allowed to be given Kurdish names, 
or to publish books in their own language. 11 8 Only since 1991 did the Turkish 
government permit the use of the Kurdish language, publication of Kurdish books and the 
use of Kurdish names. It thus has begun to recognise the existence of the Kurdish reality 
in Turkey. 
The repression of their culture and language led to uprisings of some Kurdish 
people throughout history, such as the Seyh Sait Rebellion in 1925. The most powerful 
and well-organized uprisings were in the early 1980s just after the last military 
intervention when the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) was formed. The PKK started to 
use armed terrorism in order to reach its final aim, the creation of an independent 
Kurdistan. It claimed territories from Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The PKK's main 
targets were the Turkish officials who were working in the southeast region of Turkey, 
along with the Kurds who did not support independence and who were loyal to the 
Turkish state. The PKK then spread its operations to the western portions of the country, 
terrorizing big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The Turkish state experienced 
Kurdish guerrilla operations for about 15 years until 1999 when the leader of the 
organization was captured in Kenya and sent to the island-prison of Imrali. Fighting was 
stopped unilaterally by the PKK after the capture of its leader. The conflict between the 
Turkish officials and PKK claimed about 35,000 lives. It also caused underdevelopment 
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in the southeast region of Turkey as the economy declined and no investment took place 
due to the fear of terrorist attacks. 
During the years of conflict, Kurds suffered in terms of their cultural rights and 
the right to use their language freely. The use of the Kurdish language and even the use of 
the colours of the Kurdish flag became taboo. For instance, after the 1991 parliamentary 
elections, the People's Labour Party (HEP), which supported the independence of 
Kurdistan and the PKK, formed an alliance with one of the major Turkish parties. HEP 
members got elected to the Turkish parliament in 1991. However, in the first session of 
the parliament, one of the female members of the party was wearing a barrette with the 
colours of the Kurdish flag (green, red, yellow) and started to take her oath in Kurdish. 
Some other members of the political party (HEP) also started to take their oaths in 
Kurdish and this caused chaos within parliament due to protests from other members. The 
members of the HEP were taken into custody, as they were required to take their oath in 
the Turkish language in the parliament according to the law. Shortly after the incident, 
HEP members of the parliament lost their political immunity and their party was closed 
by the Constitutional Court for acting against the unity principle of the Republic of 
Turkey. HEP was accused of supporting an illegal terrorist organisation (PKK) and trying 
to form an independent state of Kurdistan. The European Union thinks this occurrence 
was a violation of their freedom of speech. 11 9 The era of terrorism made such things 
related to the Kurdish question very controversial. Those who tried to afford Kurds their 
cultural rights were assumed to be affiliated with the PKK, and their efforts were strongly 
opposed by authorities who were backed by military officials. 
119 Amnesty International: Turkey Campaign (1996), No security without human rights, available from 
http://www .amnesty. org/ ailib/intcam/turkey /turk l.htm 
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Why is the Kurdish question the most sensitive issue for the Turkish Government? 
Turkey was formed on the principle of territorial unity. That is, the territorial borders of 
the state are considered absolute and cannot be changed by force. According to the 
Turkish Constitution, Turkey is an indivisible unit, including all its peoples. Thus, if 
some group of Kurdish citizens asks for independence, that desire directly contradicts the 
main foundation ofthe Republic ofTurkey.120 
There is an ongoing fear of the separation of the southeast region from the rest of 
Turkey, especially among Turkish officials, regardless of who holds power. Journalist 
Hasan Cemal argues that this fear is rooted in the Ottoman past of Turkey, when the 
empire lost its territories through a painful process. 12 1 The former undersecretary of 
foreign affairs, Ozdem Sanberk, describes Turkey as going "from an Empire that had 
territories on the shores of Adriatic in 1913, to conquered territories with foreign vessels 
waiting in Istanbul in 1919". 122 He argues that in the last days of the Ottomans, the rapid 
loss of territories caused a trauma from which Turks still cannot rid themselves. 
The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed by the Ottoman Government after World 
War I, proposed a free Kurdistan State in the southeast region of the country.123 The 
Treaty of Sevres never came into force (due to the Treaty of Lausanne which was signed 
after the Turkish war of independence in 1923 and replaced the Treaty of Sevres). Today, 
talk of an independent state for Kurdistan echoes back to the last days of the Ottoman 
Empire, and to the Treaty of Sevres. There is a fear of the re-birth of the Treaty of Sevres 
(a fear ofloss of territory) which causes Turkish officials to be very strict on the Kurdish 
120 Turkish Constitution, Article 3, available from http://www.turkey.org/politics/p_consti.htm 
121 Hasan Cemal, "Boliinme Korkusunun Sona Ermesi Iryin", Milliyet, 23 September 2000. 
122 loc. cit. 
123 Treaty of Sevres, Section III, Article 62, available from http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/part3.html 
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question. Mr. Sanberk argues that this fear is very inappropriate in today's world. The 
concept of sovereignty in today's world is not the same as it was in the early 1900s. 
Today there is mutual interdependence in international relations, stronger than any other 
time in the history. Each country has to form alliances and has to cooperate with others, 
including even the United States of America. There is no "absolute sovereignty" as may 
have existed a hundred years ago. Sanberk talks about Turkey's NATO membership in 
1952, when Turkey had to give up some of its sovereignty, but gained more than it 
lost.I24 
The fear of the re-birth of the Treaty of Sevres leads officials to fear democracy 
for the Kurdish population. European Union membership is seen as a trap by some 
authorities who claim that membership would cause the division of the Turkish State. The 
European Union criteria require Turkey to provide education in the Kurdish language for 
the Kurds, along with allowing TV and radio broadcasts in Kurdish. These requirements 
are also the first steps in the PKK's plans for the creation of an independent state. 
Therefore, the Turkish authorities claim that these reforms would support a terrorist 
organization and that the Turkish state can never let them become reality, as this would 
encourage the PKK to move further towards the creation of the free state ofKurdistan. 
Turkish authorities are in a position to provide human rights and freedoms for 
every citizen of their state, and should not let the PKK's objectives prevent them doing 
what is right for their Kurdish citizens. Turkish officials should be able to distinguish 
between the PKK - an illegal terrorist group - and the Kurdish people. Concerns about the 
PKK and its means of achieving its objectives should not stop the Turkish government 
124 Hasan Cemal, "Boli.inme Korkusunun Sona Ermesi lyin", Milliyet, 23 September 2000. 
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from providing the human rights that its Kurdish citizens deserve. Providing cultural 
rights for the Kurdish people would also push Turkey one step closer to EU membership. 
Journalist Hasan Cemal argues that Turkey has to provide rights for its Kurdish 
citizens sooner or later.125 It is not possible to ignore such a huge group, especially in the 
21st century. There are Kurds living not only in Turkey, but also in Iraq, Iran, Syria and 
around the world. They live all over Europe and North America. They have Kurdish 
institutions and chairs in universities. They conduct systematic research on their language 
and their alphabet. Cemal claims that the desire of the Kurds abroad is not to act against 
Turkey by freeing Kurds in Turkey; most of them do their research and studies to survive 
as Kurds with their own culture and language.126 Thus, despite Turkey's claims that the 
Kurdish culture is a premature and underdeveloped one, it does and will continue to exist. 
There will always be human beings who identify themselves as Kurdish, studying their 
culture, history and language. Hence, Turkey has to recognize the rights of its Kurdish 
citizens sooner or later. 
Another issue related to the Kurdish question is the situation of the leader of the 
PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, who has been on the island-jail oflmrali for more than two years. 
Ocalan was captured in the Greek embassy in Kenya by Turkish authorities and 
sentenced to death after a long trial in 1999. The European Union tends to see Ocalan as a 
freedom fighter, whereas Turkey considers him to be a terrorist leader, responsible for the 
deaths of 35,000 people.127 The European Court of Human Rights asked Turkey in 1999 
125 Hasan Cemal, "Kurt Karti 'na Karsi Oyun Plani . .. (1)", Milliyet, 15 December 2000. 
126 Loc. cit. 
127 Austrian daily Salzburger Nachrichter, 17 February 2000. 
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to defer the execution of Abdullah Ocalan in order to enable the Court to examine the 
admissibility and merits of the applicant's complaints under the Convention. 128 
The EU also wants its applicant states to abolish the death penalty in their legal 
system. Turkey, however, still has the death penalty (although no death penalty 
executions have been exercised since 1986). The Turkish government thinks that if the 
death penalty were to be removed, it would appear it is being removed only to save 
Ocalan, which would cause protests from many Turkish people. The majority of Turkish 
citizens want to see Ocalan executed; however, this execution would not help the already 
turbulent relations between the EU and Turkey.129 The government's biggest handicap 
with the death penalty and specifically with the Ocalan case comes from one of the 
parties in the present three party coalition government in Turkey. As of 1999, the 
National Movement Party (MHP) has the second biggest share of seats in the Turkish 
parliament and campaigned in favour of Ocalan' s execution. Therefore, it is very difficult 
for the MHP to agree to removal of the death penalty. Also, it would mean sparing 
Ocalan, whose execution they support. 
Thus, the Turkish government is currently experiencing a major dilemma on the 
death penalty issue. Turkey has to remove the death penalty in order to become a full 
member of the EU, but the government has to satisfy the concerns of the general public 
as well as the European Union. The Turkish parliament passed a law in 1986 which 
provided for the commutation of the death penalty to a thirty-year prison sentence.130 It 
128 Turkey 2000, "2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession", 
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does not seem sensible to keep a death penalty that has not been imposed for more than 
15 years. The government should remove the death penalty and deal with the reaction 
from the public, thus moving Turkey closer to accession negotiations. 
With the capture of Ocalan, PKK's terrorism seems over, especially with the 
leader's declaration that they will not fight for a free Kurdistan anymore and will try to 
achieve cultural rights peacefully. 131 It thus could be very dangerous to execute Ocalan, 
because it will likely make his supporters angry towards the Turkish state and could lead 
them back to their guns to start fighting again. 
At this point, Turkey should try to support the economic well being of the 
southeast region, and should escape from syndromes of the past (such as the trauma 
associated with the Treaty of Sevres). It should also provide for human rights for its 
Kurdish citizens. The time is right for Turkey to expand human rights in the region, as 
there is no fear of terrorism in the region anymore. Thus, the terrorism excuse no longer 
justifies doing nothing. It is a historic chance for Turkey to improve the human rights 
situation of the Kurds and to improve the economic conditions of the southeast region of 
the country. The economic gap between the eastern and western halves of the country is 
getting more unbearable, and the human rights abuses that the Turkish state commits 
against its citizens of Kurdish origin are becoming more unacceptable. A solution to the 
Kurdish question is one of the most important steps Turkey has to take in order to 
approach full membership in the European Union. 
In order to fulfill the EU's political criteria, Turkey has to accept some major 
human rights instruments. Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights on 
the abolition of the death penalty, as well as the Convention on the Elimination of All 
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Forms of Racial Discrimination, have not yet been signed by Turkey. Turkey also has not 
signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities and the Statute of International Criminal Court. 132 Turkey should do so, and 
expand its human rights practices, not only to get closer to EU membership, but also for 
its own peaceful and prosperous future. 
5.3 Torture and Treatment of Prisoners 
Another obstacle for Turkish membership is the ongoing use of torture in Turkey. 
Use of torture, unacceptable under the Copenhagen Criteria, is discussed under "civil and 
political rights" in the recent report of the European Commission. 133 International human 
rights organizations report torture cases, most of which are related to persons in detention 
suspected of "acts of terrorism or separatism". 134 In addition to international 
organizations, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) Human Rights Committee 
has published around ten reports regarding torture in Turkey. In 1992, the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture publicly condemned Turkey for its widespread 
practice of torture and severe ill-treatment of people in custody. 135Various articles of the 
Turkish Anti-Terror Law which was adopted only in 1991 are in contravention of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. For instance, Article 15 of the Law states that 
132 Turkey 2000, "2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession", 
November 8th, 2000, p. 11. 
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135 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey 's relations with a changing Europe, p. 86. 
136 Raymonde Dury, "Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on EC-Turkey relations", 
EP Session Documents, DOC-EN/RR/208559, 21 May 1992, p. 7. 
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proceedings against those accused of torture can only be undertaken with the 
authorization of the Minister of the Interior and can only be conducted before a state 
security tribunal. Also, Article 11 of the Law states that people may be held in police 
custody for up to 30 days, which also contradicts the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 136 
Insufficient and delayed medical care for prisoners is another issue to be dealt 
with. These are thought of as a form of torture. Prison conditions are the major cause of 
concern here for the European Commission. Although these have never been as bad as 
depicted in the movie "Midnight Express", Turkish officials should improve conditions 
and thus repair the image of the country's prisons. 137 It has been widely held that Turkish 
prisons are controlled by illegal organizations and are corrupt. Turkish authorities 
recently led an operation to take control of the prisons, which caused the death of around 
fifteen prisoners, who were on a hunger strike. 138 The reason for the hunger strike was 
mainly opposition to the eleven newly built (so-called F-type) prisons. In these prisons, 
small cells for one to three prisoners will replace the current big dormitories. These 
prisons are designed for prisoners who have been convicted of membership in terrorist 
and interest-based criminal organizations. Some prisoners went on a strike to protest the 
new prisons. The Turkish government however had already declared that the new prisons 
would respect the basic international requirements like the European Prison Rules of the 
Council of Europe and the UN minimum prison standards. 139 Thus, the new prison 
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system does not contradict the political section of the Copenhagen Criteria, as long as 
torture is not being exercised. 
In order to prevent torture and ill treatment, the Turkish government ratified both 
the UN and the European Conventions for Prevention of Torture. Moreover, in 1991, a 
Ministry of Human Rights was established, with responsibility for supervising the 
observance of human rights in Turkey and for bringing the country to EC standards in 
this area. 140 
5.4 Military Influence in Political Life 
Another obstacle Turkey faces in terms of the democratic principles of the 
Copenhagen Criteria is military influence in Turkish politics. There is no other 
democratic state in Europe where the army has such a strong involvement in daily politics. 
In terms of the democratic principles of the Copenhagen criteria, the powerful status of 
the military in Turkey makes Turkish integration impossible without some major changes 
being implemented by Turkish civil authorities. 
The Turkish military has been strong from the beginning. Modem Turkey was 
founded by a general, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in 1923. Turkey experienced three coups 
in four decades, in 1960, 1971, 1980 and another one in 1997. (This last was called a 
"post-modem coup" because the military did not intervene directly but forced the 
Islamic-led government to resign). 141 The aim of the interventions was to bring about 
significant changes in Turkish democracy and to protect the state philosophy of 
141 Turkish daily Yeni Gandem, 28 February 2001. 
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Kemalism. 142 After the coup in 1980, the military-backed government prepared and 
ratified the 1982 Constitution, which still governs the country. Article 35 of the Turkish 
Armed Services Internal Code states that 'the duty of the armed forces is to protect and 
safeguard Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the Constitution' .143 
The constitution named the generals as the guardians of Turkey's secular government and 
territorial integrity, which covers almost any issue from the fifteen-year war against 
Kurdish separatists to the post-modern coup (of 1997). According to the 1982 
constitution, the National Security Council (MGK) was formed as an advisory board to 
the government. Government officials and generals get together and discuss the issues 
that are on the agenda once a month. 
The National Security Council is the main body where high-ranking military 
officials talk with government officials on important issues. The National Security 
Council, even though it is an advisory body, looks undemocratic by European standards. 
The military argues that its officials only offer their opinions according to the strategic 
needs of Turkey and that the MGK has no binding powers. However, it has been the 
experience of the country that if governments do not take into account the views of the 
Council, they are forced to resign. In 1997, military officials accused the government of 
tolerating fundamentalist Islamic uprisings, and called on the MGK to take strict actions. 
After about five months, the government had to resign due to strong opposition from 
military officials. 
142 Meltem Miiftiiler-Bac, Turkey 's relations with a changing Europe, p. 76. 
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The military in Turkey seems to be strongly critical, if not of Turkey's integration 
in Europe, then at least of certain prerequisite steps. Although no military official has 
ever openly opposed Turkey's entry, high-ranking military officials have argued that 
meeting the Copenhagen Criteria will cause Turkey to lose its territorial integrity by 
supporting a free Kurdistan in the southeast region of the country, and that Turkey has to 
rethink entering, as there are things it cannot sacrifice for the sake of full membership. 144 
The military's main concerns are concentrated on the Kurdish issue. Allowing Kurds to 
broadcast in their own language and to be educated in Kurdish are considered very 
dangerous, as these could lead to the disassociation of the society and to the 
independence of the Kurds. As the main driving force behind the fifteen-year fight 
against the separatist PKK, the military has some understandable reservations about 
Kurdish rights. However, as was stated before, since terrorism is no longer a fact in 
southeast Turkey, the cultural and civil reforms can and should be pursued in order to 
sustain ongoing peace in the area. 
The military's influence is not only limited to the National Security Council. 
Again, unlike any other democratic state in the world, Turkish military officials are 
strongly involved in daily politics and express their views regarding the domestic and 
foreign affairs of the country, outside as well as inside Council meetings. Recently, one 
general of the Turkish army, Halil Simsek, gave a speech opposed to Turkish integration 
into the European Union. 145 He claimed that the strategy that the EU is offering Turkey in 
order to start its negotiation talks is aimed at the disunification of Turkey, mainly 
emphasizing the cultural rights for Kurdish citizens. Moreover, he argued that the EU 
145 loc. cit. 
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does not want to include Turkey, but is merely using Turkey's candidacy as a tool to 
make the country weaker. Simsek argued that the EU' s final aim is an independent state 
of Kurdistan in the southeast region of the country. Although it is understandable that 
military officials are very sensitive about the Kurdish question, it is totally unrealistic to 
accuse the EU of working to weaken the country. While there might be some parallel 
concerns of the EU and the PKK, resolving such issues should be left to the civilian 
authorities, as they are left to civilians in all democratic countries. 
Contrary to the claims of military officials, the EU does not ask for strict human 
rights and democratization reforms only from Turkey. The European Union provides a 
set of criteria for all applicant countries, and Turkey is one of the countries that has to 
fulfill them or be left out of the process. For instance, Bulgaria, which is another 
applicant state, was able to start its negotiation talks only after it provided some 
democratic rights and freedoms to its Turkish minority. The EU's new strategy (to ask for 
human rights improvements first, and then to start the accession talks only if there has 
been an improvement in human rights conditions) could be explained by the difficulties 
that the EU faced during the previous enlargements with Greece, Spain and Portugal in 
terms of the political section of the Copenhagen Criteria. The EU now prefers not to start 
the accession talks with a country that has major democratic problems. There is no doubt 
that the Copenhagen Criteria are being applied to all candidate states, and that the criteria 
are meant to ensure the applicant state is becoming a truly democratic state with the fair 
practice ofthe rule of law. 
The role of the military in Turkey is one of the issues Turkey has to deal with in 
order to start negotiation talks. There is no place for military coups within Western 
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democracies. Hence, the interference of the military in Turkish political life is totally 
unfavourable and illegitimate. 146 Moreover, contrary to military claims, EU membership 
would help Turkey solve its internal problems faster and more peacefully. EU 
membership does not mean the end of the Unitary State. Even Spain, which is already a 
member of the EU, is a unitary state with regional autonomy. 147 Therefore, military 
officials should let civilians do their jobs and not interfere in the daily political issues of 
the country. Eliminating the strong influence of military officials in the Council would 
redefine the role of the National Security Council. The best way to eliminate the military 
power in civilian politics is to make the number of civilians in the Council greater than 
the number of military officials. This way, the National Security Council could carry on 
its advisory position. Turkey has to put an end to the political role of the military in order 
to be classified as a democracy. 148 
5.5 Freedom of Speech 
Another obstacle on the way to full membership in the EU is the limits to freedom 
of speech in Turkey. The 1980 Constitution limited the right to express ideas freely if 
these ideas are against the fundamental principles of the Republic of Turkey. Turkish 
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courts restrict the expression of views with which the state disagrees, especially when it 
concerns the population ofKurdish origin or religion. 149 
Article 312 of the Turkish Criminal Act states that "anyone expressing his views 
on the basis of discrimination of class, race, religion, sect or region will be considered to 
be committing a crime against the Republic of Turkey, and will not become political 
party members, or Members of Parliament or mayors". 150 The article takes away all 
political freedoms of the accused person, and there is no way to get these rights back 
unless the president forgives the accused. The accused can go to jail from one to three 
years depending on the crime. The former Istanbul Mayor, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was 
accused of discriminating against people according to their religion and was sent to 
prison for a year, in 1999. The reason for that was a poem he read in one of his visits to 
southeast Turkey. The poem talked about the mosques and how they will become the 
centres of the movement that the Mayor was supporting, called "The System of Fairness", 
which supports Islamic Rule in the country. Moreover, the EU expressed a major concern 
when the former Chairman of the Human Rights Association in Turkey, Mr Birdal, was 
sent to prison in March 2000 under the terms of Article 312 of the Turkish Criminal Code. 
The EU also declared its concern when former Prime Minister Erbakan was sentenced to 
a one-year imprisonment in 2000 under the same article for "inciting religious and ethnic 
hatred" in a speech he made in 1994. 151 
The European Union argues that the 3121h article of the Turkish Criminal Code is 
against basic human rights because it limits freedom of expression and speech. The 
151 Turkey 2000, "2000 Regular Report from the commission on Turkey' s progress towards accession", 
November 8th, 2000, p. 17. 
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European Parliament in 2000 asked the Turkish government to remove this article 
completely, and this is one ofthe issues to be solved before starting negotiation talks.152 
There are two sides to the discussion of the 31 ih article. According to the head of 
the Supreme Court in Turkey, the 31ih article should not be removed because it is the 
main protector of the secular principle of the state. 153 On the other hand, the 31ih article 
becomes an international problem when the European Parliament asks the government to 
remove it. If Turkey reformed the article according to universal legal principles, there 
would be no problems with the EU. However, Turkey insists on keeping the article as it is, 
in the name of protecting "secularism". It is obvious that the way the article is 
implemented is against the principle of freedom of expression. Turkish officials, using it 
as a threat against the Islamic-led party members (e.g., the previous mayor of Istanbul), 
have politicized the 31ih article. Politicization of the law now causes trouble in Turkey 
with reference to the Copenhagen Criteria. 
In order for Turkey to start accession talks with the EU, the 3121h article should be 
reformed according to freedom of speech principles. Keeping the law as it is would not 
only prevent Turkey from joining the EU, but would also label Turkey as a land where 
human rights abuses are taking place. Article 312 is another issue (like giving the Kurds 
their cultural rights) which Turkey should deal with not only to reach European standards, 
but also for the sake of its own citizens. If Turkey wants to have a real democracy where 
the state is the protector of freedom of speech for everyone, the article should be removed 
or reformed in the near future. 
152 Taha Akyol, "312. Madde", Milliyet, 14 April 2000. 
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5.6 The Cyprus Dispute 
According to the Helsinki Summit decisions regarding Turkey's full membership, 
the Cyprus dispute should be resolved by the end of 2002. The Cyprus dispute is one of 
the most complicated issues of international relations due to the de facto status of the 
island (i.e., two separate states). What makes the dispute even more complicated is the 
candidacy status of Cyprus with the EU. When the island was divided in two, following 
the Turkish military intervention in 1974, the southern part of the island continued to 
represent the whole island on all international stages, and its Greek administration was 
recognized as the sole representative of the island. The Greek Cypriot administration 
however has no power in northern Cyprus. There have been ongoing negotiations to solve 
the dispute under the leadership of the United Nations and the United States of America. 
However, no solution has been reached so far. 
Cyprus has already started its accession talks with the EU. There is a division 
however among the members of the Union regarding its membership. Cyprus gets its 
most important support regarding full membership from Greece. France, on the other 
hand, opposes Cypriot membership, arguing that it would carry the Cypriot dispute into 
the Union, which would not help to solve the issue. 154 Another big power of the European 
Union, Germany, pays more attention to eastern enlargement. Because Greece threatens 
to veto the entire enlargement process if Cyprus is not included, Germany wants to accept 
the divided island into the Union regardless of the conflict. 155 
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How can a solution be achieved in Cyprus? A brief historical look could help us 
understand the dynamics of Cyprus, and how a solution could be achieved. Cyprus was 
part ofthe Ottoman Empire from 1571 to 1878, when the Ottomans temporarily gave its 
administration to the United Kingdom. It was ruled by Britain from 1878 to 1960. Cyprus 
gained independence from Britain in 1960. The Republic of Cyprus was formed on the 
basis oftwo communities having an equal voice in power, under the guarantees of Greece, 
Turkey and Britain. Greek and Turkish Cypriots could only live peacefully until 1963, 
when the Greek President of the island, Makarios, attempted to make thirteen 
amendments to the Constitution, taking back the rights of Turkish Cypriots to participate 
in government decisions. Turkish Cypriots reacted to that attempt, and conflicts broke out 
between the two communities in 1963, 1964 and 1967. The Greek leadership on the 
island, with the support of Greek Cypriots, wanted to be part of Greece. Turkey on the 
other hand tried to protect the Turkish minority on the island. The 1960 agreements, on 
which the Republic of Cyprus was formed, recognized the right of military intervention 
by the guarantors should the status of Cyprus be threatened. 156 
In 197 4, the Greek junta regime attempted a coup d'etat against the Greek Cypriot 
President Makarios and tried to annex the island to Greece, which violated the 1960 
agreements. 157 The Turkish government tried to find a peaceful, diplomatic solution to 
the violation of the sovereignty of Cyprus. However, the United Nations and Britain 
failed to take action on the situation in Cyprus. 158 The Turkish government invoked its 
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right as guarantor and intervened militarily. Turkish military forces divided the island 
into two, with Turkish Cypriots living in the north, and Greeks in the south. United 
Nations-led negotiation talks to achieve a solution started in 1975. In 1983, Turkish 
Cypriots declared their independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC), which was only recognized by Turkey. In the declaration, the Turkish Cypriots 
stated that their final aim was to achieve partnership with the Greek Cypriots within a 
federal framework. 159 The Republic of Cyprus, led by the Greek administration of 
southern Cyprus, is still recognized as the sole representative of the island by rest of the 
world except Turkey. 
The two sides of the dispute have two different proposals for a solution. The 
Greek administration favours a federal state of Cyprus. According to this proposal, the 
Republic of Cyprus will remain as a single state, but each community (Greeks & Turks, 
or the south and the north) will have a say in internal affairs. Turkish Cypriots on the 
other hand do not want to give up their independence unless they become part of a 
confederation of Cyprus. 160 They argue that going back to being ruled by Greek Cypriots, 
as they were before 1974 (the president of the Republic was a Greek Cypriot), means 
going back to the bloody period of the 1960s and early 1970s. 16 1 What Turkish Cypriots 
want is not very different from the Greek Cypriots. One favours federation, and the other 
favours confederation. Both proposals offer self-rule for both communities. It looks like 
both parties are playing with words, and do not try hard enough to find a solution to the 
dispute. The best example of this is the behaviour of the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf 
159 Siikrii Giirel, Turkey and Greece: a difficult Aegean relationship , C. Balkir and A. Williams (eds), 
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Denktas, during the negotiation talks. In the past, he left the negotiation table or even 
refused to attend the meetings just because the official papers of the United Nations did 
not mention his name as President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The 
Greek Cypriot administration, on the other hand, also seems reluctant to endorse any new 
proposal by the Turkish side, even though it favours a similar proposal. Thus, neither the 
Turkish Cypriots nor the Greeks are trying their best. The Greek Cypriots seem to be 
happy with the situation in which they are the internationally recognized entity 
representing the whole of Cyprus. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriots do not want to 
lose their independence, even though it is not absolute. 
The Turkish Cypriots heavily rely on Turkey and are backed by Turkey 
economically. Greece and the Greek Cypriots argue that the Turkish Cypriot leaders obey 
the dictates of Ankara and that it is Turkey which sets the agenda for the Cyprus 
negotiations. 162 Cyprus is one of the issues affecting Turkey's membership of the EU due 
to the fact that Greece is already a member of the EU and supports Cypriot full 
membership in the Union. For instance, the Cyprus dispute was one of the issues 
discussed by Greece during the negotiations between Turkey and the EU for the Customs 
Union Agreement in 1994. 163 Moreover, at the Dublin Summit of 1990, the Community 
officially adopted a policy stating that future relations between Turkey and the EC were 
linked directly to a solution to the Cyprus dispute. 164 Thus Turkey has to help solve the 
problem in order to join the Union. Turkey finds this obstacle unacceptable. It argues that 
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no one insisted the problem be solved when Greece was joining in 1981. After the 
Helsinki decisions, Turkey declared that it supports talks between the two communities. 
Turkey assumes that the Cyprus issue is not as important as the other issues, such as 
human rights or the military's role in Turkey. The Cyprus dispute became one of the 
criteria for Turkey as a result of Greek pressures within the EU. Turkey was not declared 
a candidate state in the past due to the Greek veto of the Turkish application for full 
membership. In the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey obtained official candidacy status 
only after Greece lifted its veto on Turkey. As there has been no improvement of the 
dispute so far, it looks like the Cyprus dispute will stay unresolved until the year 2003, 
which is the EU deadline for a solution in the dispute. 
Although the Cyprus dispute is not the most important political obstacle in the 
Turkish application for full membership, it will pose a serious problem if there is no 
solution to the dispute in two years. A solution to the Cyprus dispute is necessary in order 
for accession talks to start with the European Union. 
5. 7 Conclusion 
Turkey is the only current applicant country that could not start accession talks 
with the European Union. The main reason for this is its lack of fulfillment of the 
political section of the Copenhagen Criteria. Although recent EU reports suggest that 
Turkey is in the process of meeting the political criteria, it is not really possible for 
Turkey to start negotiations within the near future. In order to meet the criteria, Turkey 
has to improve its human rights situation, particularly regarding the cultural rights and 
freedoms of its Kurdish people. Moreover, the death penalty must be removed from the 
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Turkish legal system, as the EU requires its applicants not impose the penalty. Use of 
torture and prison conditions are other concerns for the EU in terms of human rights . 
Freedom of speech is also an issue. Hence the Turkish government should provide this 
freedom for all, in order to meet the criteria. Another obstacle is military influence in the 
political life, which is not acceptable in European democracies. Turkey must reform the 
National Security Council to assure that the country meets the standards of a true 
democracy. Lastly, in order to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey must put a greater 
effort into finding a solution in Cyprus. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Turkish membership in the European Union is in line with the EU' s strategic 
interests. Europe aims to have an effective role to play in the Caucasus, the Middle East, 
and Central Asia. It is questionable whether the EU enlargement towards the East will 
have the same importance if Turkey is not included. For instance, there is a growing 
interest in Caucasus petroleum, and strategically Turkey is an important gateway to carry 
the natural gas from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and to the rest of Europe. 
Moreover, Turkey is of crucial importance to Middle East politics (e.g. its role during the 
Gulf War). Turkey lies in the triangle of the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, 
and is a key factor in the EU' s effectiveness in this region 
With Turkey's full membership, the EU will genuinely become a multicultural 
entity. There are Muslim populations already living within the existing EU countries. 
Including a vastly Muslim country like Turkey will further enrich the EU's 
multiculturalism. It will also help to redefine the EU' s image of being currently a 
"Christian Club". Having a non-Christian state as a full member will prove that the EU's 
door is not open only to Christianity. 
Examining the negative side of Turkey's membership, the most problematic part 
seems to be freedom of movement. There is already a large number of Turkish workers 
all over Europe who have been experiencing problems integrating problems with 
European societies. Germany, which has the biggest Turkish population in Europe, 
argues that the EU must formulate a policy of "movement" before Turkey's integration; 
preventing Turkish immigrants from travelling to the EU countries freely. Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain had to wait for some years before taking advantage of the free 
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movement of people within the European Union. Twenty-four percent of all Turks living 
in Germany are unemployed, and the Europeans fear that in the event of Turkey's 
membership the number of Turks will double. 165 It is expected that Poland will have to 
wait for eight years before taking advantage of the free movement of people. 166 Thus, it 
would be only logical to give at least ten years to Turkey before exercising that right. 
Apart from the free movement of people, Turkey's representation in the EU 
institutions is another worry of EU politicians. Turkey is a big country with 65 million 
inhabitants. Germany is the most populated country in Europe with 81 million people. 
Turkey will be the second largest state within the EU after Germany, and it will probably 
be the first largest state with around 100 million inhabitants within 20 years . Ifwe take its 
representation in the European Parliament, it will have 87 parliamentarians out of 626 
seats, which will be the largest after Germany and on par with France, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom. 167 Hence, Turkey's full membership will mean that Turkey will be 
represented together with the five biggest countries in the European Parliament. 
Turkey's full integration would have a huge impact on the EU budget as well. 
Turkey will be one of the countries that will typically receive more than it contributes. 
According to 1999 figures, Turkey's financial contributions to the EU would be 1,938 
billion euro. On the other hand, Turkey would receive eleven billion euro from the EU 
funds every year. Thus, Turkey would receive 5.5 euro for every one euro it contributes. 
However, Turkey would not be the only country to get more that it contributes. The 
figure is 4.5 euro for every one euro for Greece and four to one for Portugal. Ireland 
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receives six euro for every one euro it contributes. Thus, Turkey will be among these 
countries which gain more than they contribute.168 
6.1 What Does the EU Mean to Turkey? 
Westernization has been the state orientation of the Turkish Republic since 1923. 
Turkish foreign policy was shaped according to the Westernization principles that were 
set by the founder of Turkey, Atatiirk. The goal was to be part of Western civilization. 
Westernization basically means being part of Europe economically, socially and 
politically. European Union membership is the last hurdle Turkey needs to cross to fulfill 
that goal. 
Full membership within the EU would mean democratization along European 
norms. There are various democratisation measures that Turkey has to take in order to 
start negotiation talks. These measures will help the country guarantee more human rights 
for everybody, will ensure an efficient legal system based on the rule of law within the 
country, will provide freedom of speech in any field, and moreover will consolidate the 
civil society along European values. The EU membership process already helped the 
government in taking some measures to adjust the political and economic system in 
Turkey. EU candidacy created a clear "road map" for domestic change and its foreign 
policy orientation. 
EU membership will also help Turkey solve its identity problem in one sense. At 
the same time, membership in the EU may also create some tensions at the public level 
about further westernization. The ongoing discussion of whether Turkey is Asian or 
167 UK Parliament, available from http://www.parliament.uk/commonsllib/research/rp99/rp99-054.pdf 
168 AB 'den haberler, available from http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/abhaber/2000/01-02.pdf 
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European will finally have a clear conclusion. Full membership will enrich Turkish 
culture and tradition, and cosmopolitanism may become a trend. Although European 
culture will also be enriched by Turkey's integration in the EU, Turkey would benefit 
more than Europe from the new cosmopolitanism resulting from integration in the 
European Union. 
Economically, although the Turkish economy would suffer in the short term due 
to the protectionist policies of the EU, in the long term membership will enhance the 
Turkish economy. The EU market will be further opened for Turkish goods. The areas in 
which Turkey is powerful (e.g., textiles) will benefit from membership especially. 
Though Turkey currently has a customs union agreement with the EU, there are still 
restrictions on free trade between the EU and Turkey. Hence, EU membership will 
remove all the trade barriers between the Union and Turkey, which will help the Turkish 
economy to grow quickly. This will also bring new technology to Turkey. 
If the negative aspects of the membership are examined for Turkey, first of all, 
Turkey would not be able to pursue an independent foreign policy. The limitation would 
most particularly harm Turkey's relations with the Central Asian Turkic republics, where 
Turkey has special economic and political relations. As EU membership would mean 
giving up state sovereignty to a superior authority, Turkey would also be dependent on 
EU policies in many areas. For instance, the EU is considering having its own common 
foreign policy, which would limit the freedom of individual member states' international 
relations. Policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy will lead Turkey to act 
according to EU policies. Economically, small-sized companies may not be able to 
compete with EU companies, which might cause the disappearance of many small-sized 
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innovators. Also, Turkey would have to adopt the same economic policies as other EU 
members, such as putting the same quotas against the same products, etc., which might 
harm its other foreign trade. 
6.2 Future 
There are thirteen states seeking full membership to the European Union and 
Turkey is the only current candidate that has not started accession talks. As noted in 
Chapter I, these current negotiations will take five to ten years. Turkey has had long 
formalized relations with the European Union. It applied for the full membership long 
before any other recent applicant of the EU. The Helsinki Decisions of 1999 marked a 
turning point in EU - Turkey relations, when Turkey was officially declared a candidate. 
What makes Turkey different from the rest of the applicants is its lack of fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen Criteria. There are as well the cultural and religious differences between 
Turkey and the EU. 
Some observers argue that Turkey is non-European both geographically and 
culturally. Historical and geographical facts prove that Turkey is part of Europe. 
Geographically, it lies both in Europe and Asia, and its predecessor state was one of the 
dominant powers of Europe throughout recent history. Arguing that Turkish culture and 
religion are non-European is mistaken in the sense that Islam has been one of the major 
contributors in shaping European culture as it exists today. Discriminating against Turkey 
on the basis of religion and culture does not match the realities of Europe. 
Turkey demonstrates significant deficiencies in terms of the Copenhagen Criteria. 
Economically, Turkey is far from fulfilling the Criteria, and politically it has one of the 
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worst human rights records among the candidates. Turkey has to meet the Copenhagen 
Criteria to become a full member. The Kurdish question is of crucial importance in terms 
of fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria. In terms of human rights, Turkey has to 
provide freedom of speech for all its citizens regardless of the content of their words. 
Moreover, the Turkish military and its powerful status in Turkish daily politics do not 
help the country develop and maintain a democratic form of government. Reducing the 
number of military officials on the National Security Council and making it an advisory 
body, as envisioned in the constitution, would be desirable. The Cyprus dispute also 
constitutes an obstacle for Turkey on its way to full membership. Turkey, as one of the 
parties to the dispute, is required to hasten the negotiation process over Cyprus. 
To sum up, the European Union seems reluctant to start negotiation talks with 
Turkey due to the lack of fulfilment ofthe Copenhagen Criteria. The Turkish government 
claims that it has been discriminated against due to its religious and cultural 
characteristics. In the 1990s, it became obvious that, strategically, Turkey was still one of 
the most important countries in the region. Moreover, economically Turkey is a huge 
potential market that Europe cannot ignore. Turkey is already integrated into the 
European order, by the previous policies of the European Community toward Turkey. 
Turkey's final aim is to become a truly European state. This aim can only be insured by 
full membership in the European Union. In order to achieve this, Turkey should take all 
the necessary steps for its application, and meet the Copenhagen Criteria. 
It does not seem realistic to assume that Turkey will join the European Union in 
the near future. Turkey does not meet the Copenhagen Criteria either economically or 
politically. Moreover, out of the thirteen applicant states to join the Union, it is the only 
77 
applicant that has not yet started accession talks . Turkey is not likely to be able to fulfil 
the Criteria within ten to fifteen years due to the complexities of its internal problems 
both economically and politically. As noted, the other twelve applicant states will not all 
become full members of the European Union before the year 2010. Thus the process of 
negotiating membership, once the criteria are met, is a lengthy one, of at least five years. 
Turkey therefore probably cannot be admitted to membership prior to 2020. 
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